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I.

Introduction
Near a small, rural lake in Piedmont Alabama, Charles Jarrell killed his brother-in-law,

Marty Shuler, on May 8, 1990.1 In 1991 the United States indicted David “Ronnie” Chandler for
capital murder under the federal death penalty statute, claiming that Chandler was a drug kingpin
who had hired Jarrell to kill Shuler.2 Subsequently, Chandler retained Drew Redden, an able and
experienced criminal defense attorney,3 to defend him at trial.4 The events that followed
illustrate a problem that frequently arises when an attorney is representing a capital defendant
who has a strong claim of innocence.
Redden immediately began preparing Chandler’s case.5 After interviewing “at least 67
witnesses” in the Piedmont area, Redden determined that the Government’s case against
*
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Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310.
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At the time Chandler hired him, Redden had tried over 1000 cases. Id. at 1310 n.3. He
was both a former prosecutor at the U.S. Attorney’s Office and President of the Alabama Bar, a
member of the American College of Trial Lawyers and the International Society of Barristers,
listed in America’s Best Lawyers “for his criminal defense work,” and described as “an
extremely talented defense counsel, probably the best in the state.” Id.
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Id.
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Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310.

-2Chandler was weak.6 He thus “actively pursued an acquittal”7 at trial and did not prepare
for the penalty trial which would take place only if Chandler was convicted of the capital
murder charge.8
At trial, Jarrell, the Government’s chief witness, testified that Chandler had
offered him $500 to kill Shuler, whom Chandler believed to be a police informant.9
Jarrell said that he accepted this offer, received a gun from Chandler, and drove Shuler to
Snow’s Lake where the two engaged in target practice before Jarrell shot Shuler twice,
killing him.10 Jarrell claimed that he then met Chandler and they hauled “Shuler’s body
away for burial.”11

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Capital punishment cases are conducted according to a bifurcated trial procedure:
first, there is a guilt trial at which the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty of
any of the offenses with which he is charged; if the jury finds the defendant guilty of a
capital offense, there is then a penalty trial at which the jury decides whether the
defendant will be sentenced to death or a lesser punishment. Although the precise issues
to be determined at the penalty trial vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the penalty jury
invariably makes its sentencing determination after considering aggravating factors
introduced by the prosecution and mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s
character or the circumstances of the offense introduced by the defense. See generally
Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 306 (providing
examples of capital sentencing statutes).
9

Chandler, 218 F.2d at 1310.
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Bill Rankin, Seeking Justice on Death Row; Inmate Fights for Life After
Testimony is Recanted in Federal Drug Kingpin Case, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 25,
1998, at 14A.
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Id.

-3Redden impeached Jarrell’s testimony by showing he had made several
“inconsistent statements.”12 When first arrested, Jarrell stated that he had not killed
Shuler.13 Later he said that he accidentally shot Shuler,14 and then that he had murdered
him out of “personal animosity.”15 Finally, after receiving the Government’s promise
that, in exchange for his testimony, neither he nor his son would be prosecuted for killing
Shuler,16 Jarrell implicated Chandler in the murder.17
Redden also attempted to attack Jarrell’s testimony through the introduction of
other evidence. He showed that Jarrell never received $500 from Chandler18 and had
consumed 23 beers just before shooting Shuler.19 In addition, Redden presented evidence
showing that Jarrell’s motive for killing Shuler was his anger over Shuler’s abuse of his
wife, who was Jarrell’s sister. Jarrell even admitted that less than a year before he killed
Shuler he had attempted to kill his brother-in-law because of the escalating abuse. At that
time, he told Shuler “he was going to kill him” and then placed a “pistol against Shuler’s
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Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310.
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Id. at 1311.
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Rankin, supra note 10.
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Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1311.
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Id. at 1310.

Rankin, supra note 10.

-4nose and pulled the trigger.”20 At Chandler’s trial, Jarrell told the jury that “[t]he Lord
didn’t intend for [Shuler] to die that night.”21
Although the government’s murder charge depended almost entirely on Jarrell’s
testimony, the jury convicted Chandler of capital murder, thus setting the stage for the
penalty trial.22 The verdict shocked Redden.23 He had expected an acquittal and had
done nothing “to prepare for the sentencing phase of the trial.”24 In a last minute attempt
to save his client’s life, Redden asked “Chandler’s wife . . . to round up witnesses who
could speak up for Chandler” at the penalty trial, which was to begin the following day.25
Extremely distraught, she could identify only her preacher.26
At sentencing, Redden’s primary argument was that the jury should not impose
the death sentence because of its lingering doubt as to Chandler’s guilt. He also brought
out that the defendant had no prior convictions and called his wife and mother to testify
as mitigating witnesses.27 In rebuttal, the prosecutor reminded the jury that even Charles
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-5Manson and “Jack the Ripper had a mother.”28 The jury unanimously recommended that
Chandler “be sentenced to death.”29
Later, Chandler sought to vacate his death sentence on the ground that he did not
receive effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Specifically, he claimed that
Redden’s representation was unreasonable because he failed to “investigate and . . .
present character evidence” at sentencing.30 Chandler’s new attorney presented 27
witnesses who testified to numerous occasions on which Chandler had assisted others
who were in need of help. Martha Heath, for example, testified that Chandler bought her
son two new pairs of shoes after seeing him running shoeless “around Piedmont’s
projects.”31 Elaine Freeman testified that Chandler gave her neighbor’s family money to
pay for their son’s burial when he died in an auto accident.32 Jerry Masters testified that
Chandler helped erect a fellowship hall at [a] church and “didn’t charge a penny.”33
Others testified that Chandler built a porch so a disabled man could enter and exit his
house, gave needy mothers bags of groceries, and donated heavily to charities.34
Chandler claimed that Redden’s failure to do the investigation necessary to find these
witnesses so that their testimony could be presented at the penalty trial constituted
28

Id.
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Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1312.
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Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1313 n.8.
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Id. For other mitigating evidence presented at the hearing, see Chandler, 218
F.3d at 1312 n.8.

-6deficient performance, thus satisfying the first prong of Strickland v. Washington’s test
for ineffective assistance of counsel.35
The Eleventh Circuit, in a 6-5 decision, rejected Chandler’s claim. The court
concluded that “focusing on acquittal at trial and then on residual doubt at sentencing
(instead of other forms of mitigation) can be reasonable . . . especially when . . . the
evidence of guilt [is] not overwhelming.”36 As the Government did not possess a strong
case against Chandler, the court held that Redden acted reasonably.37 His decision to
vigorously seek an acquittal at the expense of an investigation into mitigating evidence
did not fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”38 The Court
thus affirmed Chandler’s death sentence.
After Chandler’s death sentence was affirmed, Jarrell admitted that his testimony
at Chandler’s trial had been false.39 Nevertheless, Chandler’s subsequent efforts to obtain
relief from the courts have been unsuccessful.40 In 2001, however, President Clinton

35

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court held that in order to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must establish both that his
attorney’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 466 U.S.
at 688, and that the defendant was “prejudiced” by his attorney’s deficient performance.
Id. at 692.
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Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1320.
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Id.
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Id. at 1327.
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The Birmingham News, State Briefs, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Feb. 23, 2001, at
Neighborhoods.
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Id.

-7commuted his death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole.41
Chandler’s case has attracted substantial media attention because of the doubts as
to Chandler’s guilt.42 Over the past decade, the surprisingly large number of cases in
which defendants sentenced to death have been exonerated43 has precipitated concern
relating to the extent to which innocent defendants are sentenced to death. Cases like
Chandler’s suggest that the cases in which defendants on death row have been exonerated
through DNA-testing44 or other evidence sufficient to meet the strict standard generally
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Id.
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See, e.g., AMERICAN JUSTICE: MARIJUANA AND MURDER (A&E television
broadcast, Sept. 19, 2001) (recounts the events leading to Chandler’s conviction as well
as the important events that followed—i.e., Jarrell’s recantation, the 11th Circuit’s
affirmation of Chandler’s death sentence, and former President Clinton’s commutation of
that sentence).
43

Determining the number of defendants sentenced to death who were actually
innocent in the sense that they had no involvement in the crime with which they were
charged is, of course, difficult. Barring unusual circumstances, a court that reverses the
conviction of a defendant sentenced to death does not even attempt to determine the
defendant’s actual guilt or innocence. In a surprising number of cases, however, DNA or
other evidence has provided seemingly conclusive proof that defendants sentenced to
death were innocent of the capital offense for which they were convicted. See, e.g.,
James S. Liebman, The New Death Penalty Debate: What’s DNA Got To Do With It?, 33
COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 537 (2002) (observing that in November, 1998, a
conference held at Northwestern University “brought national attention to the fact that, as
of then, seventy-five men and women whom American juries had sentenced to die . . .
had been exonerated as innocent”). Since 1973, evidence of a defendant’s innocence has
freed 111 people from death row. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death
Penalty, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6
(current as of July 28, 2003).
44

Since 1973, twelve people have been exonerated and released from death row
by DNA evidence. Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 337 (2002).

-8required to convince a court of the defendant’s innocence45 could be just the tip of the
iceberg. There may be many other cases in which innocent defendants sentenced to death
45

When a defendant who claims she was wrongfully convicted seeks relief
through the appellate process, she is likely to encounter formidable obstacles. See Lissa
Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 1241, 1271 (2001). Appellate courts do not have the authority to hear new
evidence, and most such courts cannot “reverse a conviction because they believe that the
jury was wrong.” Id. These courts can review an alleged wrongful conviction, but they
must do so on the grounds that the trial court convicted the appellant on insufficient
evidence. Id. When doing so, the court may examine only record evidence and must
view that “evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. They must then
determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
Convicted defendants may also seek a “new trial based on newly discovered
evidence.” Id. at 1292. However, such trials are “rarely granted” due to “severe time
limitations” and the need to “show a very high probability of success on the merits.” Id.
In federal courts, for example, Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that a motion for a new trial “be made within three years of final judgment.” Id.
at 1292-93. The rule also requires a court to grant “a new trial . . . only where: (1) the
[new] evidence . . . [has] been discovered since the trial; (2) the party seeking the new
trial . . . [has shown] diligence in the attempt to procure the newly discovered evidence;
(3) the evidence relied on [is] not . . . merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence
[is] . . . material to the issues involved; and (5) [the evidence is] of such [a] nature that in
a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal.” Id. at 1293.
If these remedies fail, a defendant who claims who was wrongfully convicted has
two other options: she may file a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, or seek executive
clemency. Habeas corpus provides only a slim chance of relief because the Supreme
Court, in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) “drastically limited the right of a
convicted defendant to invoke [it] based on a claim of actual innocence.” Id. at 1295.
Even if a defendant would otherwise qualify for habeas relief, moreover, she still has to
surmount the new barriers imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2267 (1996). See generally James S. Liebman, An
“Effective Death Penalty”? AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67
BROOKLYN L. REV. 411, 415-18 (2001) (discussing the obstacles posed by AEDPA for
wrongfully convicted capital defendants).
Even when a defendant can show that it is likely she was wrongfully convicted,
obtaining executive clemency is generally difficult. In most jurisdictions, the clemency
power is “entirely discretionary” and subject to the “political process.” Griffin, supra at
1299. As there is no constituency “favoring the release of convicted criminals,” id.,
executive clemency is unlikely to be granted unless the defendant can make a compelling
showing that she was wrongfully convicted.

-9are unable to obtain relief because they are unable to produce evidence that will be
sufficient to establish their innocence.46 The Chandler case thus exemplifies a situation
in which a possibly innocent defendant who is sentenced to death is unable to obtain
relief from the courts.
But the Chandler case is also significant because of the strategic problems it
presented for Chandler’s lawyer. When a lawyer is representing a capital defendant who
has a strong claim of innocence, how should the lawyer allocate her resources in

46

With respect to criminal convictions in general, one National “study suggests
that ‘the extent of factually incorrect convictions in our system must be much greater than
anyone wants to believe.’” Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful
Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1357
(1997). Although one might hope that fewer mistakes would be made in capital cases in
which the death penalty is imposed, knowledgeable authorities, including judges who
have had first hand experience with capital trials, indicate that this is not the case. For
example, an Illinois Supreme Court Justice stated:
Despite the courts’ efforts to fashion a death penalty scheme that is just,
fair, and reliable, the system is not working. Innocent people are being
sentenced to death. . . . If [some wrongly convicted] men dodged the
executioner, it was only because of luck and the dedication of the
attorneys, reporters, family members and volunteers who labored to win
their release. They survived despite the criminal justice system, not
because of it. The truth is that, left to the devices of the court system, they
would probably have all ended up dead at the hands of the state for crimes
they did not commit. One must wonder how many others have not been
so fortunate.
Illinois v. Bull, 705 N.E.2d 824, 847 (Ill. 1998) (Harrison, J., concurring and dissenting in
part).
Similarly, pointing to the “exonerations of more than 100 people on death row
based on DNA and other evidence,” Judge Wolf, a federal judge who was a former
federal prosecutor and official in the Justice Department, stated that “innocent individuals
are sentenced to death, and undoubtedly executed, much more often than previously
understood.” Adam Liptak, U.S. Judge Sees Growing Signs that Innocent Are Executed,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at A12.

-10preparing for the guilt and penalty phases47 of the capital case? Should she expend
resources in preparing for a penalty trial which will take place only if the defendant is
convicted of the capital offense at the guilt trial? Or should she focus entirely on trying
to show the defendant’s innocence at the guilt trial? And, if the defendant is convicted of
the capital offense, what strategy should she pursue at the penalty trial? Should she focus
primarily on reasserting the defendant’s claim of innocence, seeking to convince the jury
that they should spare the defendant because of their lingering doubt as to his guilt? Or
should she accept the jury’s verdict at the guilt stage and focus primarily on introducing
mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant’s background to the jury?
Chandler’s attorney’s decision to focus primarily on obtaining a favorable verdict
is not unusual, especially for criminal defense attorneys with limited experience in
representing capital defendants. Like Chandler’s attorney, these attorneys may believe
that preparing for the penalty trial will be unnecessary because the defendant will not be
convicted of the capital offense at the guilt trial. In addition, because the attorney is
seeking to maximize the defendant’s chances at the guilt trial, she may decide that
investigating for mitigating evidence to be introduced at the penalty trial will not be an
optimal use of her limited resources. Even if the attorney believes there is some chance
that the defendant will be convicted of the capital offense and that introducing mitigating
evidence at the penalty trial could be valuable, she may still believe that the proper
overall strategy is to focus almost entirely on maximizing the defendant’s chances at the
guilt trial. When the attorney adopts this strategy, her options at the penalty trial (if it
occurs) will generally be limited. In most cases, the failure to investigate for mitigating
47

supra.

For an explanation of the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial, see note 8,

-11evidence prior to trial will make it impossible to introduce significant mitigating evidence
at the penalty trial. Since the penalty trial usually takes place immediately after the jury
adjudicates the defendant guilty of the capital offense, the defense will generally not have
sufficient time between the guilty verdict and the beginning of the penalty trial to conduct
the kind of investigation that would produce persuasive mitigating evidence.
In other cases, either the defendant’s wishes or the lawyer’s view of the
significance of the defendant’s claim of innocence may shape the lawyer’s strategy. A
defendant who has a strong claim of innocence may be especially likely to tell his
attorney that, in the event there is a penalty trial, no mitigating evidence should be
presented. If the lawyer believes the client has a strong claim of innocence, moreover,
she may believe that seeking mitigating evidence is unnecessary because, even if the
defendant is convicted, the best strategy at the possible penalty trial will be to focus
exclusively on reasserting the defendant’s claim of innocence. A lawyer familiar with
death penalty scholarship, moreover, may justify this strategy by pointing to empirical
studies which show that a jury’s lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt is the factor
that will most strongly lead them to spare the defendant’s life.48 Based on these studies,
the lawyer may assert that in appropriate cases it is best to argue solely on the basis of
lingering doubt, thus maximizing the likelihood that the jury will spare the defendant’s
life on the basis of this factor.

48

See, e.g., William Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or
Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1,
51-52 (1994) (interviews from jurors in 10 Florida cases indicated that jurors’ lingering
doubt as to the defendant’s guilt was the most important factor to jurors who voted for
life imprisonment). See generally Scott Sundby, 83 CORNELL L. REV. n.44
(Summarizing data relating to lingering doubt).

-12For more than two decades, however, experienced capital defense attorneys have
recognized that introducing mitigating evidence that explains the defendant’s background
and history to the penalty jury is generally the best way to dissuade the jury from
imposing a death sentence.49 As the Supreme Court observed in Wiggins v. Smith, 50 the
1989 ABA Standards provide that an attorney representing a capital defendant has an
obligation to investigate for “all reasonably available mitigating evidence” prior to trial.51
In view of these established professional norms, under what circumstances, if any, can a
defense attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence
reasonably conclude that she need not conduct an investigation for such evidence? And
when the attorney makes this decision, under what circumstance will her failure to
investigate constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?
Although one might think that the answers to these two questions would be the
same, the Court’s decisions in Strickland and its progeny indicated otherwise. In
determining whether a capital defense attorney’s failure to investigate for or to introduce
mitigating evidence at a penalty trial is ineffective representation, courts must apply
Strickland v. Washington’s two prong test52 for determining whether counsel was
ineffective. As to the first prong—whether the attorney’s representation “fell below an

49

See Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The
Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 341-42, 361 (1993) [hereinafter
White, Effective Assistance]; Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 323-24, 335-37 (1983).
50

123 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2003).

51

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 11.4.1(c), 93 (1989).
52

For an explanation of Strickland’s two prong test, see note 35, supra.

-13objective standard of reasonableness,”53 Strickland provided guidelines that require
courts to afford substantial deference to an attorney’s strategic choices. As to a capital
defense attorney’s decisions with respect to presenting mitigating evidence, the Court
said that strategic choices made after a full investigation of the facts and law are
“virtually unchallengeable” and that “choices made after less than complete investigation
are reasonable” if “reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation.”54 The Court added, moreover, that counsel’s performance must be judged
on the basis of “information supplied by the defendant.”55 Applying these standards,
lower courts have frequently held that strategic choices not to seek or not to present
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial will not be deficient performance when they are
based on either instructions from the defendant56 or the attorney’s view as to the
importance of reasserting the defendant’s claim of innocence at the penalty trial.57
In Wiggins v. Smith,58 however, the Court made it clear that at least in some
situations a capital defendant’s attorney’s failure to investigate for mitigating evidence
cannot be justified by a strategic decision to focus primarily on reasserting the
53

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

54

Id. at 690-91.

55

Id. at 691.
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See, e.g., Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897 (4th Cir. 2000); Coleman v. Mitchell, 244
F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2001); Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002); Mitchell v.
Kemp, 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985); Williams v. Calderon, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (C.D.
CA 1998); Zagorski v. Tennessee, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1998).
57

See, e.g., Parker v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corrs., 331 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2003);
Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d
710 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Kokoraleis, 963 F. Supp 1473 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
58

123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).

-14defendant’s claim of innocence at the penalty trial. Although Wiggins’ scope is unclear,
the Court’s analysis indicated that in evaluating a capital defendant’s attorney’s
performance, the practices of experienced capital defense attorneys, as reflected in
professional standards such as the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, will at least sometimes provide the norms against
which the attorney’s performance must be measured. In assessing the reasonableness of
strategic choices by attorneys representing defendants with strong claims of innocence, it
is thus appropriate to illuminate these norms through examining and explaining strategic
choices made by defense attorneys who specialize in capital cases.
In this article, I will contrast the choices of experienced attorneys with those made
by less experienced attorneys, and assess Wiggins’ possible impact on the question of
whether the latter choices constitute deficient performance under the first prong of the
Strickland test. Broadly stated, my thesis is that, in representing capital defendants with a
strong claim of innocence, certain axioms that govern the practices of experienced capital
defense attorneys should be viewed as professional norms; and, in most instances, a
capital defense attorney’s failure to comply with these norms should constitute deficient
performance within the meaning of Strickland.
In developing this thesis, the article proceeds as follows: Part II considers the
potential impact of Wiggins v. Smith. After briefly explaining Wiggins’ holding, this Part
identifies and discusses three situations of particular concern to attorneys representing
capital defendants with strong claims of innocence in which Wiggins’ application is
unclear. Parts III and IV then seek to illuminate the appropriate standard of care for
attorneys representing capital defendants with strong claims of innocence by considering

-15empirical data bearing on how attorneys with varying levels of experience deal with
strategic choices relating to the penalty trial when they are representing such defendants.
Part III addresses strategic choices that arise when a defense attorney representing a
capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence is preparing for the penalty trial,
focusing especially on decisions that are influenced by the attorney’s view of her
resources or the instructions she has received from the capital defendant. Part IV
addresses strategic choices that arise when the attorney is deciding what type of
mitigating evidence should be presented at the penalty trial, focusing first on the
circumstances under which the attorney should argue lingering doubt to the penalty jury,
and then on the effect that the attorney’s decision to argue lingering doubt should have on
her strategy with respect to introducing mitigating evidence. In order to provide a
nuanced account of experienced attorneys’ practices with respect to these issues, I draw
upon interviews with experienced capital defense attorneys59 and penalty trial
transcripts60 that reveal the ways in which they implemented their strategic choices.
Drawing from various sources, including the material presented in Parts III and
IV, Part V seeks to define the professional norms that should govern defense attorneys’
strategic choices when they are representing capital defendants with strong claims of
innocence. As I have indicated, my thesis is that these norms should not only serve as
59

In preparing this article, I have interviewed 12 criminal defense attorneys, most
of whom have had extensive experience in defending capital defendants, and two
mitigation experts who have had extensive experience in providing social histories (based
on investigations for mitigating evidence) for capital defendants. When I rely on specific
information provided by any of these people, the name of the person interviewed and the
date of the interview appears in the footnote.
60

The penalty trial transcripts referred to (as well as others not quoted) were sent
to me by attorneys or mitigation experts involved in the cases. These transcripts are on
file with the author.

-16guides to defense attorneys but also as the standards that must be met when the attorney’s
performance is being measured against the first prong of the Strickland test. In Part VI, I
conclude by commenting on some of the broader implications of the issues discussed in
the article.
II.

Wiggins v. Smith’s Impact on Counsel’s Strategic Choices
In Wiggins v. Smith61 the Court considered an ineffective assistance of counsel

case in which the reasonableness of a capital defendant’s attorneys’ decision to curtail
investigation for mitigating evidence was at issue. The government sought to justify the
attorneys’ failure to conduct a full investigation for mitigating evidence on the ground
that the attorneys had made a tactical choice to focus their penalty trial strategy entirely
on relitigating the defendant’s guilt. The Court’s refusal to accept the government’s
position may have a significant impact in other cases where capital defense attorneys’
strategic choices are animated by a decision to focus on lingering doubt or other
innocence claims at the penalty trial. Wiggins’ attorneys’ strategic choice was made
under unusual circumstances, however. In assessing Wiggins’ immediate and long-term
impact, it is thus necessary first to explain the Court’s holding and then to identify three
issues that the Court’s opinion left unresolved.
A.

61

Id.

The Wiggins Decision

-17Kevin Wiggins was charged with the murder of Florence Lacs, a 77-year-old
woman who was found drowned in the bathtub of her ransacked apartment in Woodlawn,
Maryland on September 17, 1988.62 Ms. Lacs was last seen alive on the afternoon of
September 15 when a government witness said Wiggins thanked her for watching his
Sheetrock.63 Geraldine Armstrong, Wiggins’ girlfriend, testified that Wiggins picked her
up at about 7:45 p.m. on September 15. At that time, Wiggins was driving Ms. Lacs’
Chevette and was in possession of her credit card, which Wiggins and Armstrong used
when they went shopping that evening and the next day.64 When Wiggins was arrested,
he told the police that he had found Ms. Lacs’ car with the keys in it in a restaurant
parking lot on September 16 and that Armstrong “didn’t have anything to do with this.”65
The government also sought to establish through expert testimony and other evidence that
Ms. Lacs had been murdered on September 15, the same day on which Wiggins had been
seen in the vicinity of her apartment.66
The government’s case was thus based primarily on evidence that Wiggins was
seen near the victim’s apartment shortly before the time of her murder and had possession

62

Id. at 2531-32.

63

Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 2002).

64

Id. at 634.

65

Id.

66

The medical examiner testified that the victim had been murdered and that the
time of death could have been September 15. In addition, a friend of the victim’s
testified that on September 15 the victim had been wearing the clothes that were found on
her murdered body on September 17. And Wiggins’ employer testified that Wiggins had
been working near the defendant’s apartment on the afternoon of September 15. Id. at
632-34.

-18of property taken from her apartment after the time of the murder.67 No eyewitnesses or
forensic evidence supported the government’s claim that Wiggins had been in Ms. Lacs’
apartment on September 15. On the other hand, an unidentified finger-print was found in
the apartment and the police did have other possible suspects, especially Armstrong’s
brother who lived just below Ms. Lacs’ apartment.68
The defense sought to refute the government’s case by showing that Ms. Lacs was
not dead when Wiggins was shown to be in possession of the property taken from her
apartment. To establish this claim, Dr. Kaufman, an expert in forensic pathology,
testified that, “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Mrs. Lacs’ time of death
was no earlier than 3 a.m. on Saturday, September 17.”69 If Ms. Lacs had not been killed
until September 17, the government’s case against Wiggins was obviously insufficient to
establish his guilt.70
The defense had elected to have the defendant’s guilt determined by a judge
sitting without a jury. The judge rejected Dr. Kaufman’s conclusion as to the time of
Ms. Lacs’ death. He then concluded that Wiggins’ possession of property taken from a
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In addition, two inmates testified that Wiggins confessed to the murder while
incarcerated; in arriving at a verdict, however, the trial judge indicated that he did not
believe either of these inmates. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 634 (4th Cir. 2002).
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See Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 n.9, 557 (D. Md. 2001).

69
70

Id. at 555.

Even if the government’s evidence relating to Ms. Lacs’ time of death was
accepted, the government’s case against Wiggins was weak. Indeed, the federal district
judge who considered the case on habeas concluded that Wiggins was entitled to relief on
the ground that “no rational finder of fact could have found Wiggins guilty of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 (D. Md.
2001).

-19recently murdered victim combined with the other circumstantial evidence was sufficient
to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.71
The defense chose to have Wiggins’ penalty trial before a jury. In order to obtain
a death sentence, the government had to prove that Wiggins was a “principal in the first
degree,” meaning that he actually killed Ms. Lacs72 and that the aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors.73 One month prior to the scheduled beginning of the
penalty trial, defense counsel filed a motion for bifurcation of the penalty trial so that the
defense could first present evidence showing that Wiggins did not kill Ms. Lacs and then,
if necessary, present a mitigation case. The defense claimed that “separating the two
cases would prevent the introduction of mitigating evidence from diluting their claim that
Wiggins was not directly responsible for the murder.”74
About a month later, the judge denied the defense’s bifurcation motion and the
penalty trial began. In her opening statement, one of Wiggins’ two defense attorneys told
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In reaching this verdict, the trial judge relied on five factual findings:
(1) Wiggins was in the vicinity of the apartment at the time of the murder; (2) he gave a
false statement to the police about the stolen goods; (3) he knew the victim; (4) the victim
was wearing the same clothes on the September 15 as she was when she was found dead
on September 17; (5) the victim’s apartment had been ransacked. See Wiggins v.
Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 555-56 (2001).
72

Under Maryland’s capital sentencing statute, the jury may not impose the death
penalty unless it first concludes that the defendant was a “principal in the first degree.”
MD. CODE ANN., [Criminal Law] § 2-202(a)(2)(i) (2002). Under Maryland law, “[a]
principal in the first degree is one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand,
or by an inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent.” State v. Ward, 396 A.2d
1041, 1046-47 (Md. 1978).
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MD. CODE. ANN., [Criminal Law] § 2-203(i)(2)(i) (2002) (Jury must determine
by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating evidence.).
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Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2532.

-20the jury they would “hear evidence suggesting that someone other than Wiggins actually
killed Lacs.”75 She also told them they were going to hear evidence relating to Wiggins’
life and that he had “had a very difficult life.”76 During the penalty trial, however, the
defense introduced no evidence relating to Wiggins’ life history.77 Instead, it again
introduced expert testimony attacking the government’s theory as to Ms. Lacs’ time of
death. In essence, the defense sought to convince the jury that Wiggins could not have
“actually killed” the victim because he was not guilty of her murder.
At the conclusion of the penalty trial, the judge instructed the jury that Wiggins
had been convicted of the first degree murder of Ms. Lacs and that they were required to
accept that conviction as “binding” even if they believed it “to have been in error.”78 He
then explained the standard for determining whether Wiggins was a “principal in the first
degree” and instructed them that, if they found that Wiggins was a “principal in the first
degree,” they should determine whether the death penalty should be imposed by
weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors.79 The jury imposed a death sentence.
Wiggins claimed that his trial attorneys were ineffective because of their failure to
conduct a full investigation for mitigating evidence relating to Wiggins’ personal history.
Wiggins’ attorneys had obtained some information relating to his background, including
a presentence investigation report prepared by the Division of Parole and Probation and
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-21DSS records “documenting [Wiggins’] various placements in the State’s foster care
system.”80 They had not, however, retained a forensic social worker to prepare a full
compilation of Wiggins’ social history, even though funds for that purpose were
available.81 Wiggins’ senior attorney explained that the attorneys had decided, well in
advance of trial, “to focus their efforts on ‘retrying the factual case’ and disputing
Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder.”82 They thus believed that compiling a
social history was unnecessary because they did not want to present a shot-gun defense
which might dilute the force of the evidence disputing Wiggins’ responsibility.
The Maryland State courts rejected Wiggins’ ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, concluding that his attorneys had made a “deliberate tactical” decision to
concentrate their efforts on convincing the penalty jury that Wiggins was not responsible
for the murder.83 Wiggins challenged this ruling in a federal writ of habeas corpus. In
view of the applicable federal habeas statute,84 the issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the Maryland State courts’ ruling denying Wiggins’ ineffective assistance of
counsel claim was an “unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”85 In
order to establish this, Wiggins first had to show that his attorneys’ decision to curtail
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28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).
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Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2534 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(1996)).

-22investigation so that they did not have Wiggins’ complete social history was deficient
performance under the first prong of the Strickland test.86
In Strickland, the Court had said that “strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation.”87 The Court thus had to determine
whether Wiggins’ attorneys’ strategy of curtailing investigation so as to focus on
relitigating the defendant’s guilt was reasonable.
In addressing this issue, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion focused on a capital
defense attorney’s obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence. Justice O’Connor
stated that Wiggins’ attorneys’ decision to curtail the investigation “fell short of the
professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989” because “standard practice in
Maryland in capital cases” at that time “included the preparation of a social history
report.”88 She indicated, moreover, that Wiggins’ attorneys’ decision could not be
attributed to lack of resources because “the Public Defender’s office made funds
available for the retention of a forensic social worker” who would prepare the necessary
report.89
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In addition, Wiggins had to show that his attorney’s deficient performance
constituted prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test. See note 35, supra.
In order to obtain relief under § 2254(d)(1), moreover, Wiggins had to show that the
Maryland state court’s conclusion that the defendant had not established that his
attorney’s performance was deficient constituted an “unreasonable application of federal
law.”
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466 U.S. 668, 690-91.
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Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2536.
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-23The majority also observed that “[t]he ABA Guidelines provide that
investigations into mitigating evidence ‘should comprise efforts to discover all
reasonably available mitigating evidence,’”90 adding that based on both the ABA
Guidelines and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, this investigation should delve
into various topics, including the defendant’s “family and social history.”91 Justice
O’Connor referred to these standards as “well defined norms,”92 thus implying that, in the
absence of a reasonable justification for the defense attorney’s failure to conduct an
investigation for reasonably available mitigating evidence, the attorney’s failure to
conduct such an investigation would constitute deficient performance under Strickland.

90

Id. at 2537 (emphasis in original).
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-24Justice O’Connor further concluded that Wiggins’ attorneys’ decision to curtail
investigation could not be justified as a reasonable strategic decision; rather, the attorneys
decision to abandon their investigation when they did “made a fully informed sentencing
strategy impossible.”93
B.

Three Unresolved Issues

Although Wiggins was simply applying Strickland’s ineffective assistance of
counsel test, the Court’s analysis indicated that its view of the standard of care required
by an attorney representing a capital defendant may have evolved since Strickland was
decided in 1984.94 Although in Strickland the Court indicated that professional standards
such as those articulated in the ABA Guidelines would not necessarily define the
standard of care for criminal defense attorneys,95 the Wiggins majority indicated that at
least the ABA Guidelines relating to a capital defendant’s attorney’s obligation to
investigate for “all reasonably available mitigating evidence” does articulate the standard
of care for a defense attorney representing a capital defendant. The defense attorney may
not trump this obligation, moreover, by simply asserting that she adopted a strategy that
focused exclusively on reasserting the defendant’s possible innocence at the penalty trial.
In assessing Wiggins’ application to other situations in which a capital defense
attorney curtails investigation because she opts for a strategy of reasserting a claim of
innocence at the penalty trial, three questions seem especially significant: First, in
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Id. at 2538.
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For the argument that the standard of care required by a capital defendant’s
attorney would evolve as the Court became more familiar with the practices of
experienced capital defense attorneys, see White, Effective Assistance, supra note 49.
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.

-25defining counsel’s duty to investigate for mitigating evidence, what does the Court mean
by “all reasonably available mitigating evidence?” Second, can a capital defense attorney
justify a decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence because of the
defendant’s request that no such evidence be presented at the penalty trial? And, third,
when may the attorney make a reasonable decision to curtail investigation (or not to
present mitigating evidence) on the basis of a strategic choice that relates to the quality of
the available mitigating evidence?
1. The Duty to Investigate for “All Reasonably Available Mitigating
Evidence”
As explained by the Court, Wiggins provides a clear example of a case in which
the mitigating evidence counsel failed to investigate was “reasonably available.” At the
time of Wiggins’ trial, “the Public Defender’s Office made funds available for the
retention of a forensic social worker”96 who would prepare a report relating to the
defendant’s background. Using funds to obtain such a report would not affect the extent
to which counsel would have resources available for obtaining investigators or expert
witnesses who would strengthen the defendant’s defense at the guilt trial, moreover,
because the guilt trial had already been completed. In Wiggins, the mitigating evidence
was thus “reasonably available” not only because counsel could obtain it but also because
it could be obtained without any strain on existing resources.
In other cases, the availability of potential mitigating evidence will not be so
clear. In many jurisdictions, judges have discretion as to the amount of funds to be
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Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2536.

-26allocated to capital defense attorneys for investigation.97 In exercising this discretion,
judges may limit the maximum number of expert witnesses or inform the attorney that the
total amount of funds for investigation cannot exceed a certain amount.98 In cases where
97

In most states, statutes provide judges with wide discretion as to the expenses to
be allocated for the investigation and preparation of a capital case, see, e.g., TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ART. 26.052(f)-(g) (2003) (counsel may request and court shall grant
reasonable “advance payment of expenses to investigate potential defenses”); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (2002) (court may grant prior authorization for “investigative
or expert services or other similar services” necessary to protect defendant’s
constitutional rights “in a reasonable amount to be determined by the court”); CAL.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 987.9(a) (2003) (counsel may request fund for payment of
“investigators, experts, and others for the preparing or presentation of the defense” and “a
judge . . . shall rule on the reasonableness of the request and shall disburse an appropriate
amount of money to the defendant’s attorney”). See generally Stephen Bright, Neither
Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Equal Services To The Poor When Life
And Liberty Are At Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 820 (judges routinely use their
discretion to deny defense counsel the funds needed to adequately investigate a case and
often do so by requiring counsel to show the need for such funds—“a showing that
frequently cannot be made without the very . . . assistance that is sought.”).
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See, e.g., State v. Daniel, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 967 at 30-34 (Trial
court did not abuse discretion in refusing to appoint a mitigation specialist because
defendant failed to make the required showing that (1) D would be deprived of a fair trial
without such assistance and (2) there was a reasonable likelihood that such assistance
would materially assist the defense); United States v. Hurn, 52 M.J. 629, 633 (1999)
(Trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to appoint a mitigation specialist when
the court had already appointed a psychologist); Commonwealth v. Shabazz, 2003 Va.
Cir. LEXIS 74 (2003) (Trial court properly limited mitigation specialist to 20 hours to
establish factual basis for full investigation for mitigating evidence). But see Williams v.
State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1384 (Ind. 1996) (Finds abuse of discretion in trial court’s
decision to limit mitigation specialist to 25 hours of investigation, but establishes no clear
standards for determining when a judge’s failure to authorize defense investigation will
constitute an abuse of discretion).
The judge’s authority to exercise discretion under these statutes is limited,
however, by Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1975), which holds that, upon a sufficient
showing that his mental condition will be a significant factor in a capital case, a capital
defendant is entitled to compensation for a psychiatrist to assist the defense. Lower
courts have interpreted Ake as requiring compensation of other defense experts upon an
adequate showing that they are needed to assist the defense in developing a significant
issue. See White, Effective Assistance, supra note 49, at 342. Under Ake, a judge should
not be permitted to limit the number of expert witnesses or to limit the compensation for
experts if the defense makes a sufficient showing that an expert is needed to develop a

-27a capital defendant has a strong claim of innocence, his attorney may believe—rightly or
wrongly—that she should opt for presenting the strongest defense at the guilt stage rather
than diminishing the resources available for that purpose by requesting funds to
investigate for mitigating evidence.99 In this situation, the attorney may opt either to not
investigate for mitigating evidence at all or to curtail the investigation for mitigating
evidence so as not to diminish the resources available for strengthening the defendant’s
defense at the guilt stage.
In applying Wiggins to these situations, courts will have to decide whether
counsel’s obligation to investigate for “all reasonably available mitigating evidence”
encompasses an obligation to seek to obtain all such evidence that is actually available or
only an obligation to seek “mitigating evidence” that can be obtained without placing a
strain on the resources available for other purposes.
2. The Defendant Instructs the Attorney Not to Look for Mitigating
Evidence
In Wiggins, there was no indication that the defendant had given his attorneys any
instructions relating to investigating or introducing mitigating evidence. In cases where a
capital defendant has a strong claim of innocence, however, it is not unusual for the
defendant to instruct the attorney that she is neither to investigate for mitigating evidence

particular type of mitigation evidence. In practice, however, prior to Wiggins “many
defense attorneys [did] not do a good job of making a showing of the need for funds.”
Email from Stephen Bright to Author dated 8/31/03 (on file with author) [hereinafter
Bright Email]. For further discussion of Ake, see note 248, infra and accompanying text.
99

In some cases, the defense attorney’s belief that she must choose between
allocating resources to the guilt or penalty stage may be mistaken. If the attorney can
make an sufficient showing under Ake, arguably she should be entitled to compensation
for expert witnesses at the penalty trial regardless of the funds already expended for
expert witnesses at the guilt trial. See note 98, supra.

-28nor to present it at the penalty trial in the event the defendant is convicted at the guilt
trial. In addition, at some point during the pretrial preparation, the defendant may
instruct the attorney either to stop investigating for mitigating evidence entirely or to
curtail some particular aspect of the investigation, such as interviewing the defendant’s
family members. Wiggins’ holding raises the question whether the defense attorney’s
duty to investigate for available mitigating evidence applies to cases in which the
attorney receives these kinds of instructions.
Although lower courts have addressed various situations in which a capital
defendant instructed a defendant to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence,100
Wiggins did not involve a situation in which any such instructions were given. Wiggins’
application to cases involving these kinds of instructions is thus unclear.
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See infra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.

-293.

Strategic Choices to Ignore Potential Mitigating Evidence

At Wiggins’ post- conviction hearing, Wiggins’ senior attorney explained the
attorneys’ decision to curtail investigation, testifying that they decided not to introduce
mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s background because they didn’t want to
dilute his claim of innocence.101
In Strickland and at least two later cases,102 the Court had held that, under the
circumstances presented in those cases, a capital defendant’s attorney’s decision to curtail
investigation for mitigating evidence was a reasonable strategic decision and, therefore,
did not constitute deficient performance. In Wiggins, on the other hand, the Court held
that, assuming Wiggins’ attorneys made the strategic decision not to investigate for
mitigating evidence because they wanted to focus primarily on reasserting the
defendant’s innocence at the penalty trial, the decision was unreasonable. Based on
Wiggins, when will an attorney’s strategic decision to curtail investigation because of a
choice to emphasize evidence related to innocence be unreasonable?
Characterizing Wiggins’ attorneys’ decision to curtail investigation as a strategic
decision is questionable. As the Court indicated,103 if the attorneys’ bifurcation motion
filed prior to the penalty trial had been granted, the attorneys would not have had to
worry about the possibility of diluting the evidence of Wiggins’ innocence which was
presented at the penalty trial. The attorneys would have been able to introduce that
evidence during the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding and, if that strategy was
101

Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2533.
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See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168 (1986).
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Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2532.

-30unsuccessful, introduce mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s background at the
second phase.104 As the Court stated,105 there was thus reason to believe that the
attorneys’ decision was based on “inattention” rather than strategy.106 If the Court
wanted to limit its holding in Wiggins, it could distinguish Wiggins from other situations
in which a capital defense attorney curtails investigation for mitigating evidence on the
ground that in Wiggins’ the attorneys’ decision to curtail investigation was not really a
strategic choice.
The majority stated, however, that “assuming [Wiggins’ attorneys] limited the
scope of their investigation for strategic reasons,”107 their decision was unreasonable. To
justify this conclusion, Justice O’Connor explained that the attorneys’ decision to
abandon their investigation when they did “made a fully informed sentencing strategy
impossible.”108
But why would it be unreasonable for the attorneys to decide that they would
curtail the investigation into Wiggins’ background because they wanted to focus
exclusively on relitigating his guilt? The attorneys’ reasoning might be as follows:
(1) the evidence of the defendant’s innocence was so strong that it was likely to have a

104

Id. at 2537-38.

105

Id. at 2542.

106

At the opening of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel “entreated the jury to
consider not just what Wiggins is found to have done, but also ‘who [he] is.’” 123 S. Ct.
at 2538. She then informed the jury that it “would hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a
difficult life.” Id. Despite these comments, however, counsel never presented any
evidence relating to “Wiggins’ history.” Id.
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-31powerful effect on the sentencing jury; (2) Presenting mitigating evidence relating to the
defendant’s background might dilute the strength of that evidence, making it less likely
that the jury would spare the defendant because of their lingering doubt as to his guilt;
(3) therefore, investigating for mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s background
was unnecessary because no such evidence would be introduced at the penalty trial.
The majority’s analysis indicated that this type of reasoning is untenable. Justice
O’Connor concluded that competent performance in the Wiggins case required a fuller
investigation because in view of “the strength of the available evidence,” a reasonable
attorney might well have chosen to “prioritize the mitigation case over the responsibility
challenge,” or at least to adopt both “sentencing strategies” since they were “not
necessarily mutually exclusive.”109 In other words, regardless of the attorneys’
assessment of the strength of the evidence showing Wiggins’ innocence, the attorneys
could not automatically opt for a strategy that focused solely on presenting this evidence.
The Court’s analysis thus seemed to indicate that, at least in the absence of an adequate
investigation, a capital defense attorney’s decision to rely solely on relitigating the
defendant’s guilt at the penalty trial is unreasonable.
The majority was less clear, however, in delineating the circumstances under
which a capital defendant’s attorney can make the strategic decision to curtail
investigation because her preliminary investigation convinces her that a full investigation
for mitigating evidence would be unproductive. In Wiggins, the preliminary investigation
indicated that the potential mitigating evidence related to the defendant’s troubled
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-32childhood and severe mental problems.110 Wiggins’ holding thus appears to indicate that,
in the absence of a full investigation, an attorney’s strategic decision to reject the
possibility of introducing this type of mitigating evidence would be unreasonable. The
Court’s analysis did not suggest, however, that an attorney could never reasonably make
a strategic choice to curtail investigation because she concluded that seeking additional
mitigating evidence would be unproductive. On the contrary, the Court intimated that an
attorney would be able to justify such a choice in cases where the attorney could
reasonably conclude that she would not want to introduce potential mitigating evidence
because of a concern that it would be unproductive or double-edged.111

110
111

Id. at 2536.

The Court cited with apparent approval earlier cases in which it had held that a
capital defendant’s attorney’s decision to curtail investigation was reasonable because the
attorney reasonably concluded that the evidence likely to be disclosed by further
investigation would be double-edged or unproductive. See 123 S. Ct. at 2537 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987);
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)).

-33Based on Wiggins’ holding and analysis, the circumstances under which a capital
defendant’s attorney strategic choice to curtail an investigation for mitigating evidence
will constitute deficient performance is thus also unclear.
III.

Preparing for the Penalty Trial
A.

The Division of Responsibility Between Lawyer and Client

In representing a criminal defendant, a defense attorney must ordinarily be guided
by her client with respect to the nature of the defenses presented.112 If the defendant tells
his attorney to present a defense at the guilt stage, the attorney will generally be required
to present that defense, even though she is convinced that it is very weak.113 Similarly, if
a competent capital defendant insists that the attorney present no evidence at the penalty
stage in the event he is convicted of the capital offense, the attorney must adhere to her
client’s wishes.114 In practice, however, while the defendant makes the final decision, the
defendant’s attorney will often be able to exert influence that will significantly affect that
decision. David Bruck, a South Carolina defense attorney who has participated in
hundreds of capital cases, states that one of any criminal defense attorney’s most
important roles is to “make an assessment of the strength of the defendant’s various
possible defenses and to advise the defendant as to which of those defenses should be
presented to the jury and how they should be presented.”115 When the defendant initially
asserts an implausible claim of innocence, for example, an experienced defense attorney
will generally be able to dissuade the defendant from asserting that claim at trial.
112

With respect to a lawyer’s responsibilities, most states now follow the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.2(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall abide
by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” For statutes codifying
this rule, see, e.g., 21 N.C.A.C. § 2.1.2(a) (2003); 204 PA. CODE Part V, Subpt. A, Ch.
81, Subch. A, Rule 1.2 (2003). The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility,

-34When a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence directs his attorney not
to seek or to introduce evidence at the possible penalty trial, however, the psychological
dynamics involved are likely to be more complex. In this situation, the defendant’s
position probably emanates from his belief that he should not be convicted of the capital
offense. He thus believes that his attorney’s focus should be exclusively on presenting
the strongest possible defense at the guilt trial. Preparing for the penalty trial will be a
waste of time because the penalty trial will never take place; expending time and
resources in preparing for this non-event will be counter-productive, moreover, because it
will deflect the attorney from focusing on the guilt trial. And, finally, if the defendant is
forced to contemplate the possibility of a conviction at the guilt stage, he may be inclined
which was replaced by the ABA Model Rules in most states but is still followed in a few
states, also requires that attorneys pursue their clients’ desired course of action. See
American Bar Association, ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Canon 7, EC 7-5 (1983).
113

However, an attorney cannot assist her client in “conduct that [she] knows is
. . . fraudulent.” AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Rule 1.2(d) (2002). The ABA defines “fraudulent” as “conduct that . . . has a
purpose to deceive.” Id. at Rule 1.0. Thus, an attorney cannot follow a client’s directive
to present a defense that he or she knows to be false. For states codifying this rule, see,
e.g., 204 Pa. Code Part V, Subpt. A, Ch. 81, Subch. A, Rule 1.2(d) (2003); 27 N.C.A.C.
§ 2.1.02(d) (2003).
114

For example, in Zagorski v. Tennessee, the defendant told his attorney before
trial that “if convicted, he preferred death instead of a possible life sentence.” Zagorski v.
Tennessee, 983 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1998). He then instructed counsel neither to
investigate nor present mitigating evidence. Id. The defendant remained firm in his
decision, even after his attorney informed him “about the importance of and the need to
investigate” for mitigating evidence. Id. The attorney then followed the defendant’s
instructions. Id. at 655. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that counsel acted
reasonably. The court stated that “when a competent and fully informed defendant
instructs counsel not to investigate or present mitigating evidence at trial, counsel will not
later be adjudged ineffective for following those instructions.” Id. at 657.
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Telephone Interview with David Bruck, Federal Death Penalty Resource
Attorney for South Carolina, (4/6/03) [hereinafter Bruck Interview].

-35to believe that, if the jury confounds his expectations at the guilt trial, he doesn’t care
what happens at the penalty trial. In fact, it is not uncommon for defendants with strong
claims of innocence to say to their attorneys, “I don’t want you to present any evidence at
the penalty trial. If the jury convicts me, I’d rather die than be sent to prison.”
B.

The Difference Between Experienced and Inexperienced Capital
Defense Attorneys

A capital defense attorney’s approach to the issues presented in this scenario is
likely to vary depending on the extent of her experience with capital cases. Criminal
attorneys lacking experience in capital cases will be less likely to question their clients’
desire to disregard the penalty trial because these attorneys will be naturally inclined
towards focusing their energies almost exclusively on the guilt trial. Stephen Bright, the
Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights, who specializes in capital cases,
explains that these defense attorneys, who are usually skilled and experienced at raising
issues of reasonable doubt in ordinary criminal cases, are unfamiliar with the capital
defense attorney’s role of pleading for the defendant’s life at the penalty stage of a capital
case. In fact, these lawyers may perceive that Bright’s view of the lawyer’s role at the
penalty trial—finding the social and biographical evidence relating to the defendant’s life
and then presenting it to the jury in a way that will “humanize” the defendant so that the
jury has a fuller understanding of who the defendant is, where he has come from, and
why he is the way he is116—is “a job that should be done by a social worker rather than a
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Attorneys with experience in capital cases have long recognized the importance
of introducing mitigating evidence that will humanize the capital defendant, thereby
leading the penalty jury to empathize with the defendant. See, e.g., White, Effective
Assistance, supra note 49, at 361; Goodpaster, supra note 49, at 321-24, 335-37. For an
account of a recent capital case in which a capital defendant’s attorney was able to obtain
a life sentence for his client by presenting evidence at the penalty trial that traced the

-36lawyer.”117 When a lawyer with this perspective has a client who requests that she focus
primarily or exclusively on the guilt trial, lawyers lacking experience in capital cases will
be inclined to minimize the extent to which they prepare for the penalty trial, using the
client’s instructions to justify a choice they might make in any event.118
In addition, criminal defense lawyers lacking experience in capital cases may
dismiss the importance of preparing for the penalty trial because they share their client’s
view that he will be acquitted of the capital offense. Michael Burt, a federal death
penalty resource counselor who frequently advises attorneys representing capital
defendants,119 says that lawyers with experience in ordinary criminal cases but not in
capital cases, often “grossly underestimate the difficulty in convincing a death-qualified
jury that there is a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.”120 Burt states that
“death-qualified juries do not evaluate evidence in the same way as other juries and are
thus much more likely than other juries to credit the prosecution’s evidence and less
likely to acquit the defendant or to find him guilty of a lesser [i.e. non-capital]

defendant’s troubled history, thereby obtaining the penalty jury’s empathy, see Alex
Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 32.
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Telephone Interview with Stephen Bright (3/6/03) [hereinafter Bright
Interview].
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Bright Email, supra note 98. Bright points out that, even if the client doesn’t
give the lawyer any instructions, lawyers lacking experience in capital cases will tend to
focus disproportionately on the guilt trial and not enough on the penalty trial because they
are “more comfortable with the guilt phase.” Id.
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From 1989-2002, Burt was head trial attorney in the San Francisco Public
Defender’s Office. Telephone Interview with Michael Burt (3/17/03) [hereinafter Burt
Interview].
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Burt Interview, supra note 119.

-37offense.”121 Others with wide experience in capital cases not only share Burt’s view but
state that death-qualified juries’ conviction proneness (i.e. its tendency to convict more
readily than a non-death-qualified jury) has increased in recent years.122 Experienced
practitioners have a sense that in recent years “increasing doubts about the death penalty”
have led to the exclusion of more fair-minded people from death-qualified juries.123 As a
result, capital defendants are “losing more good jurors than ever.”124
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Id.
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Michael Charlton, for example, stated that with respect to determining issues
related to guilt or innocence “the difference between ordinary juries and death-qualified
juries is far greater than most people realize.” Telephone Interview with Michael
Charlton (3/10/03) [hereinafter Charlton Interview]. For data relating to the differences
between death-qualified and non-death qualified juries, see, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162 (1986). See generally Mike Allen et al., Impact of Juror Attitudes about the
Death Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 715 (1998) (analysis of studies relating to death-qualifying the jury
indicate, death qualification produces juries that in comparison to the normal population
have “a 44% increased probability of voting for conviction”).
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In most jurisdictions, the rule allowing the government to have a deathqualified jury took root during the 19th century. In order to obtain jurors that would not
refuse to convict or to sentence a capital defendant to death because of their opposition to
capital punishment, the prosecutor was permitted to exclude veniremen whose scruples
about capital punishment might render them incapable of voting for a conviction or a
death sentence in a capital case. See Stanton D. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at
Witt’s End: Death-Qualification Reexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1986). In
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court limited the prosecutor’s right to
exclude such veniremen to cases in which the veniremen made it unmistakably clear that
their views against capital punishment would lead them to automatically vote against the
death penalty or to decline to impose a verdict that could result in a death sentence. In
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (l985), however, the Court sharply limited
Witherspoon, holding that a prosecutor may exclude a veniremen when there is sufficient
evidence that her views on capital punishment would “prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror” with respect to applying the law relating to the
circumstances under which the defendant should be convicted of a capital crime or
sentenced to death. 469 U.S. at 424. For a detailed analysis of Witherspoon and Witt, see
Krauss, supra.
124

Interview with Russell Stetler (6/5/03) [hereinafter Stetler Interview].

-38Defense attorneys who are unaware of this difference may mistakenly believe that
their ability to convince the jury of a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt will
obviate the necessity for a penalty trial. Indeed, Burt states that it is not unusual for
attorneys who lack experience in such cases to “talk themselves into thinking they don’t
have to worry about the penalty phase because they have a great shot of winning the
case.”125 Burt adds that some lawyers soliciting his advice have asked him to “validate
their decision” not to seek mitigating evidence in preparation for the penalty phase of a
capital trial because their clients, who are presenting claims of innocence at the guilt trial,
do not want them to present such evidence.126 Indeed, even some attorneys who have had
experience in capital cases can remember capital cases in which they did no preparation
for the penalty trial because they believed that a strong claim of innocence would prevail
at the guilt trial.127
Burt and other attorneys who specialize in capital cases unequivocally reject this
approach. Because they are aware that even a defendant with a strong claim of innocence
may be found guilty of a capital offense, these attorneys state that a lawyer representing a
capital defendant should always prepare for the penalty trial. At a minimum, the lawyer
125

Burt Interview, supra note 119. For a fuller explanation of Burt’s view on this
point, see Michael N. Burt, Overview: Effective Capital Representation in the Twenty
First Century, 1 CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL 7 (1998 ed.).
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Burt Interview, supra note 119.

Michael Charlton remembered at least one case in which he and the other
defense attorneys representing a Texas capital defendant decided to do no preparation for
the penalty stage of the case because they were confident that the defendant would be
acquitted. Even though that defendant was in fact acquitted, Charlton said that his
present policy is to prepare for the penalty trial whenever he represents a capital
defendant. In addition, he stated that he would make every attempt to pursue this policy
even if his client stated that he did not want to have mitigating evidence presented at the
penalty trial. Charlton Interview, supra note 122.

-39should prepare a social history of the client.128 This history, which can generally best be
assembled by an expert who has a background in psychology or social work, will trace
the defendant’s life from the time he was born (or in some cases even before he was
born) to the present.129 The history should be based on a wealth of data: information
provided by the defendant’s family members and people who have known him during the
various stages of his life, the defendant’s school and other institutional records, reports
from mental health professionals or other experts who have examined the defendant, and
other relevant data.130 One of the purposes of the social history is to provide defense
counsel with potential mitigating evidence to be presented at the penalty trial.
A capital defendant who objects to the idea of introducing mitigating evidence at
the penalty trial is, of course, likely also to object to the idea of preparing a social history
that includes potential mitigating evidence. Experienced capital defense attorneys say
that there are at least two ways to deal with such objections:131 If the defendant would
agree that a death sentence is a worse alternative than a life sentence, the attorney can
emphasize to the client that it is “always necessary to prepare for the worst.”132 The
attorney might tell her client that, even though she is hopeful that the defendant’s trial
defense will be successful, she wants to be prepared for every contingency. Therefore, it
128

Burt Interview, supra note 119; Bright Interview, supra note 117.
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For examples of social histories compiled by mitigation experts, see White,
Effective Assistance, supra note 49, at 325-29. In order to compile an adequate social
history, the mitigation expert will often need the assistance of other court-appointed
experts. See id. at 342-44.
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See White, Effective Assistance, supra note 49, at 341-42.
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-40is essential that the attorney be prepared to present persuasive mitigating evidence at the
penalty trial in the event the defendant is found guilty of the capital offense.
In addition, the defense attorney can truthfully tell her client that investigating the
defendant’s background may lead to evidence that will assist the defense at the guilt
stage.133 Witnesses who are familiar with the defendant may be able to testify to his good
character, thereby convincing the jury that the defendant is simply not the kind of a
person who could have committed the crime.134 Or if the government is introducing the
defendant’s incriminating statements to establish his guilt, evidence relating to the
defendant’s mental problems may be used to cast doubt on his statements’ reliability.135
When dealing with a capital defendant who persists in objecting to the
introduction of mitigating evidence at the penalty trial, experienced capital defense
attorneys will sometimes exert considerable pressure on the defendant to change his
mind. Richard Jaffe, an Alabama defense attorney who has represented dozens of capital
defendants, provides an example. Jaffe was appointed to represent Gary Drinkard at his
retrial for a capital offense. At his first trial, Drinkard, who consistently maintained his
133

Burt Interview, supra note 119; telephone interview with Gary Taylor, an
attorney in Austin, Texas, who specializes in representing capital defendants, (3/25/03)
[hereinafter Taylor Interview].
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A defendant in a criminal case is allowed to have witnesses testify to his good
character for the purpose of showing that, in view of his character traits, he was less
likely to have committed the crime charged. Character witnesses often testify to the
defendant’s peaceful reputation, for example, for the purpose of showing the defendant
was less likely to have attacked the victim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watkins, 2003
Pa. Lexis 969 (2003).
135

Interview with John Niland, Federal Death Penalty Resource Attorney for
Texas (3/11/03) [hereinafter Niland Interview]. For an analysis of cases in which capital
defendants with mental problems were convicted on the basis of police-induced false
confessions, see Welsh S. White, False Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 ILL. L. REV.
601 [hereinafter Niland Interview].

-41innocence, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the penalty trial
in that case, Drinkard’s attorney presented no mitigating evidence because Drinkard had
instructed him not to.136 After Drinkard’s conviction and death sentence were
reversed,137 Jaffe and two other attorneys represented Drinkard at his second trial.138
While these attorneys were preparing for Drinkard’s second trial, Drinkard
indicated that, if he were again convicted of the capital offense, he still did not want to
have any mitigating evidence presented at the penalty trial. He stated that he would
rather be executed than spend the rest of his life in prison. When Jaffe was informed of
this, he met with Drinkard for the first time. He told Drinkard that they had a great
defense team and that he thought the investigation and preparation for trial was going
very well. He then told Drinkard that he could not continue to be a part of the defense
team if Drinkard persisted in his refusal to have mitigating evidence introduced at a
possible penalty trial. When Drinkard asked why, Jaffe replied, “I don’t defend people
who want to die.” Drinkard then changed his mind and signed an agreement which stated
that he was willing to have his attorneys present mitigating evidence on his behalf in the
event that there was a penalty trial. The agreement was ultimately irrelevant, however,
because Drinkard was acquitted at his second trial.139
The pressure exerted by Jaffe on Drinkard may seem extreme. Stephen Bright
observes, however, that capital defense attorneys will often have to be very forceful in
136

Ex Parte Gary Drinkard, 777 So. 2d 295, 297 (Ala. 2000).
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Drinkard, 777 So. 2d at 297. (Reversing conviction because evidence of prior
bad acts was improperly admitted at trial.)
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Interview with Richard Jaffe (3/8/03) [hereinafter Jaffe Interview].

Jaffe Interview, supra note 138.

-42dealing with defendants who do not want to have evidence presented at the penalty trial.
Logic and other persuasive techniques that might be successful in other contexts are less
likely to be successful with these defendants because the defendants may be incapable of
either focusing on the penalty trial or understanding the impact that the failure to prepare
for that trial may have on the jury’s ultimate decision. In Bright’s judgment, however,
the “failure to prepare for the penalty trial” is not a viable option because introducing
mitigating evidence that “will provide the jury with an in-depth understanding of the
defendant” and the people connected to him is generally the only way that defense
counsel can avoid a death sentence.140 When there is a disagreement between the
attorney and the client, it is thus imperative that the attorney use every permissible means
to convince the defendant that the defense should present mitigating evidence at the
penalty trial.
C. The Attorney’s Obligation to Investigate in Preparation for the Penalty
Trial

140

Bright Interview, supra note 117.

-43From the capital defense attorney’s perspective, convincing the defendant that the
defense needs to investigate for the purpose of presenting mitigating evidence at the
penalty trial is important because it will facilitate the investigation.141 Even if the
defendant does not agree that the defense should introduce mitigating evidence at a
possible penalty trial, however, the attorney should nevertheless insist that an investigator
compile a complete social history of the defendant. From the attorney’s perspective, the
social history is indispensable for two reasons: first, as Michael Burt explained,142 it may
uncover evidence relevant to the guilt trial; second, the attorney needs the fruits of the
investigation to provide the defendant with information that will enable him to make an
informed choice with respect to his options at the penalty trial.
As I have indicated,143 a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence may
be unable to focus on the penalty trial prior to the guilt trial. In order to ensure that the
defendant makes an informed decision as to the strategy to be adopted at the penalty trial,
the defense attorney will thus sometimes have to postpone the final discussion of this
issue until the defendant has been convicted of the capital offense. In order to make the
defendant fully aware of his options at that time, however, the attorney must be aware of
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In addition to providing information relating to his own background, the
defendant may be able to identify witnesses or significant aspects of his life that will be
valuable to the investigator compiling the defendant’s social history.
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See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 115-16 and accompanying text.

-44the nature of any potential mitigating evidence so that she will be able to explain to the
defendant the value of introducing that evidence at the penalty trial.144
When a capital defendant has no objection to presenting mitigating evidence at
the penalty trial, the defense attorney’s obligation to investigate for the purpose of
presenting evidence at the penalty trial will generally be clear. As the Court observed in
Wiggins, the ABA Guidelines have long provided that a capital defense counsel’s
investigation should “comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating
evidence.”145 Neither the ABA Guidelines nor any other source suggests that a capital
defense attorney’s obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence varies depending on
the strength of the capital defendant’s defense at the guilt trial.
Is there any basis for concluding that an attorney’s obligation to investigate
should vary depending on this factor? Since every lawyer knows that defenses that
appear rock solid before trial sometimes may be eviscerated at trial, a capital defense
attorney surely cannot rely on the fact that the capital defendant’s claim of innocence will
be so strong as to negate the possibility of a penalty trial.
Some defense attorneys may believe, however, that in certain types of cases there
is no need to investigate for mitigating evidence because, even if the defendant is
convicted of the capital offense, the proper strategy at the penalty trial will be to rely
entirely on persuading the jury that they should not sentence the defendant to death
because of their lingering doubt as to his guilt. When the government’s case is based on
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For a discussion of lower court cases addressing a capital defendant’s
attorney’s obligation to inform her client of the value of introducing mitigating evidence
at the penalty trial, see at notes 254-61, infra and accompanying text.
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Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2003).

-45weak circumstantial evidence, for example, the defense attorney may assert: first, if the
defendant is convicted, a lingering doubt argument should be made to the penalty jury;
and, second, since a jury’s lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt is the factor that is
most likely to lead the jury to spare the defendant’s life,146 the attorney should not dilute
the force of the lingering doubt argument by introducing mitigating evidence relating to
the defendant’s background. In order to assess this claim’s validity, it is necessary to
consider under what circumstances the strategy of relying solely on a claim of lingering
doubt at the penalty trial is reasonable, a question that will be addressed in Part IV.
IV.

Defense Counsel’s Strategy at the Penalty Trial
A.

The Effect of the Defendant’s Claim of Innocence at the Guilt Trial

When a capital defendant who presented a claim of innocence at the guilt trial is
convicted of the capital offense, the defendant’s attorney will often need to confront the
question of whether she should continue to assert the defendant’s claim of innocence at
the penalty trial. Even though the jury rejected this claim at the guilt stage, the attorney
may believe that she should continue to assert this claim, arguing that jurors should vote
to spare the defendant’s life if they have any residual or lingering doubt as to the
defendant’s guilt. If the attorney does decide to argue that the jury should spare the
defendant’s life because of their lingering doubt as to his guilt, she may have to make
other difficult decisions, including how she should present the lingering doubt claim and
what other evidence and arguments will be compatible with that claim.
When the defense attorney believes that the claim of innocence presented at the
guilt trial was strong, she may firmly believe that she should continue to press this claim
146

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

-46at the penalty trial. When the jury in a capital case does have a lingering doubt as to the
defendant’s guilt, it seems clear that it will view such a doubt as one of the strongest
possible reasons for sparing the defendant’s life.147 If the defense attorney has asserted a
claim of innocence that seemed strong to her, she may naturally believe that at least one
of the jurors will be sufficiently persuaded by that evidence to have a lingering doubt as
to the defendant’s guilt; and, in some jurisdictions, even one such juror may be enough to
avoid a possible death sentence.148 In capital cases where a strong claim of innocence
was presented at the guilt trial, some defense attorneys will thus believe that the best
penalty trial strategy is to argue that the jury should not impose the death penalty because
of their lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. In some of these cases, moreover,
these attorneys apparently believe that the argument relating to lingering doubt is the only
argument that needs to be presented at the penalty trial. Instead of also presenting other
mitigating evidence that might give the jury additional reasons for sparing the
defendant’s life, they rely solely on the argument that the jury’s lingering doubt as to the
defendant’s guilt should lead it to impose a life sentence.149
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Id.
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Under some sentencing statutes, the jury must unanimously agree to impose the
death sentence in order to have a death sentence imposed. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 9711(c)(iv)-(v) (2002) (a capital jury must unanimously decide to impose a death
sentence, otherwise the judge will end the jury’s deliberations and sentence the defendant
to life imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2003) (the jury must unanimously find
aggravating factors and if they cannot do so unanimously, the court “shall impose a
sentence other than death . . .”); 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.11 (2002) (requiring a
“unanimous recommendation of death” and if the jury cannot agree to a sentence, the
sentence must be “imprisonment for life without parole or imprisonment for life”).
149

See, e.g., Parker v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corrs., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 9771
(11th Cir. 2003) (following defendant’s conviction, trial counsel decided to argue
residual doubt and not to present much mitigating evidence because of concern that the
mitigating evidence would do more harm than good); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d

-47Experienced capital defense attorneys, however, uniformly reject a strategy that
places undue emphasis on convincing the jury that has just convicted a defendant that
there is a lingering doubt as to that defendant’s guilt. As I have already indicated,150
jurors on a death-qualified jury are likely to evaluate evidence in a way that is strongly
favorable to the prosecution. These jurors are thus significantly less likely than the
normal population to perceive a lingering doubt, or any kind of doubt, as to a criminal
defendant’s guilt. In addition, members of any jury may believe that, once the jury has
returned a guilty verdict, that verdict resolves all possible doubts against the defendant.151
Indeed, they may feel that a defense attorney’s argument that there is still a lingering
doubt as to guilt is disrespectful to the jury in the sense that it challenges the legitimacy
of their recently returned verdict.152
Empirical data indicate, moreover, that one of the factors that is most likely to
lead jurors to spare a capital defendant’s life is their perception that the defendant is
remorseful.153 When the defense has asserted that the defendant is innocent during the

1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (trial counsel presented a strong claim of innocence at the guilt trial
and primarily a residual doubt claim at the penalty trial); Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710
(11th Cir. 1999) (same).
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See supra note 121-24 and accompanying text.
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See Sundby, supra note 48, at 1576-80 (after returning a guilty verdict, penalty
jurors frequently fail to perceive a difference between reasonable and residual doubt;
rather, they view their verdict as foreclosing any doubt as to the defendant’s guilt).
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Id. at 1578 (some jurors feel insulted at the suggestion that they should have
lingering doubts; these jurors fervently believe that they “would not have convicted the
defendant in the first place had any such doubt existed.”).
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Id. at 1566 (in interviews, jurors “frequently articulated . . . that they likely
would have voted for a life sentence instead of death had the defendant expressed
remorse.”); John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen P. Garvey, Lessons from the

-48guilt trial, the defendant cannot credibly express remorse for committing the crime at the
penalty trial. If the defense argues lingering doubt at the penalty trial, however, the jury
may view this argument as the strongest possible indication of the defendant’s lack of
remorse. If the defense insists that there is still a doubt as to whether the defendant
committed the crime, then clearly the defendant not only lacks remorse for his crime, but
is not even willing to take the first step towards accepting responsibility for committing
it.154
Experienced capital defense attorneys thus conclude that even in cases where a
strong claim of innocence has been presented at the guilt trial, the defense should
sometimes make no reference to the possibility of lingering doubt at the penalty trial.
Instead, the defense should ostensibly take the position that the guilt and penalty trials are
completely separate proceedings. If one attorney represented the defendant at the guilt
trial, a new attorney should generally represent him at the penalty trial. That attorney
may begin by telling the jury that the defense accepts the jury’s verdict. She will then
explain that the case has now entered a new stage in which the jury will have to decide
whether the defendant will be sentenced to death or life in prison and that, in deciding
this question, they will need to “look at who the defendant is.”155 The attorney will then
proceed to present mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant’s background,

Capital Jury Project, 144, 164-65 in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY
(Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003) (same).
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Id. at 1574 (concludes based on interviews with jurors that “a defendant’s
degree of remorse is largely a reflection of whether the defendant is at least
acknowledges the killing or whether he is refusing to accept any responsibility for the
killing”).
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Burt Interview, supra note 119.

-49including his childhood, his mental health, the difficulties he has encountered, his
accomplishments, and other circumstances, including perhaps “the suffering the
defendant’s family will go through if the defendant is sentenced to death.”156 Although
the attorney may hope that some jurors will refuse to vote for the death penalty because
they have a lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt,157 she will not refer to this
possibility during the penalty trial but instead will focus entirely on presenting mitigating
evidence that will provide the jury with a multi-layered picture of the defendant.
As in every capital case, defense attorneys who have presented a claim of
innocence at the guilt trial will have to make choices as to the nature of the mitigating
evidence to be presented at the penalty trial. In a typical case, the investigation of the
defendant’s social history will yield a wide array of evidence, including evidence relating
to the defendant’s troubled childhood and impaired mental health, for example, as well as
evidence relating to his positive accomplishments. Some of this evidence could be
presented at the penalty trial for the purpose of explaining why the defendant committed
the crime: his mental problems reduced his ability to control his conduct, perhaps; or the
abuse he was subjected to as a child made him more inclined to respond to stressful
situations with violence.158
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According to experienced capital defense attorneys, juries in capital cases
sometimes decide that they will not impose the death sentence during the guilt trial.
Jurors who have some doubt as to the defendant’s guilt may agree to vote for a guilty
verdict only on the condition that the jury will not impose the death sentence. Bright
Interview, supra note 117; Bruck Interview, supra note 115.
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See White, Effective Assistance, supra note 49, at 360-65.

-50In cases where the defense has presented a strong claim of innocence at the guilt
stage, experienced capital defense attorneys state that they will be less likely to introduce
mitigating evidence designed to explain why the defendant committed the crime. Their
reasoning is that it is essential for the defense to maintain a consistent theory throughout
the capital trial.159 If the defense has maintained throughout the guilt trial that the
defendant did not commit the offense, introducing evidence at the penalty trial that seems
to explain why he committed it may lead the jury to view the defense attorney as
disingenuous. If the defense’s penalty trial evidence provides an explanation for why the
defendant is likely to respond to a stressful situation with violence, for example, the jury
may feel that defense counsel should have presented this evidence at the guilt stage rather
asserting a claim of innocence without providing information that would help the jury
assess that claim.
When it is possible, the defense will thus try to present only mitigating evidence
at the penalty trial that is consistent with the defendant’s claim of innocence at the guilt
trial. Such evidence, which attorneys refer to as “good guy” evidence, may include
evidence relating to the defendant’s good character, his good employment record, or as in
the Chandler case, the help he has provided to others in various situations.160 Even if
strong evidence of this type is not available, the defense might at least be able to present
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See Lyon, supra note 44, at 708.

In some cases, capital defense attorneys will be able to introduce evidence
relating to the defendant’s positive contributions in prison. In one case, the capital
defendant’s mitigating evidence related to the fact that the defendant had defused a
dangerous situation in prison, thereby probably saving another prisoner’s life. Jaffe
Interview, supra note 138.

-51testimony that the defendant is a non-aggressive individual who does not have a prior
history of violent behavior.
If significant “good guy” evidence is introduced, it will dovetail with the claim of
innocence asserted at the guilt trial. Through presenting this evidence, the defense
attorney hopes to revive any doubts that members of the jury may have had as to the
defendant’s guilt. In the course of explaining who the defendant is, the defense attorney
hopes to reinforce the idea that the defendant is not the kind of person who would have
committed this crime. Some experienced capital defense attorneys can recall cases in
which, after they have presented strong “good guy” mitigating evidence, the penalty jury
not only declined to impose the death penalty but asked if they could change the guilty
verdict they rendered at the guilt stage.161
Unfortunately, in some cases in which the defendant has maintained his innocence
during the guilt trial, “good guy” evidence that could buttress this claim at the penalty
trial will be noticeably lacking. The only potential mitigating evidence will be witnesses
who, may be able to provide a sympathetic portrait of the defendant but can do so only by
testifying to his problems, which may include, for example, “severe mental impairment
perhaps resulting from organic brain damage and a profoundly troubled childhood in
which the defendant was subjected to horrendous abuse and profound neglect.”162
Evidence of this type is double- edged in the sense that, while it does explain where the
defendant has come from and how he got to be the way he is, it also has the potential for
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Charlton Interview, supra note 122. According to Stephen Bright, it is not at
all unusual for a capital defendant to have this kind of background. Bright Interview,
supra note 117.

-52not only eliminating any lingering doubts jurors might have had as to the defendant’s
guilt, but also strengthening their perception that sparing his life will enhance the danger
to society, a consideration that empirical data indicates will weigh heavily in the penalty
jury’s decision.163
The choice of whether to present double-edged mitigating evidence or to present
little or no mitigating evidence might seem to present a dilemma for a capital defense
attorney. When confronted with this choice, however, experienced capital defense
attorneys uniformly agree that the double-edged evidence must be presented. Stephen
Bright states that in a capital case defense counsel should always present mitigating
evidence that will explain the defendant’s background and history to the jury, thereby
enabling the jury to gain an understanding of the defendant as a person.164 As another
experienced attorney explains, “You have to put the jury in the defendant’s
neighborhood” so that they will be able to “understand where he’s been” and “what it
was like growing up in the way he did.”165
If no mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s background is presented, the
jury is likely to feel they “have no reason to spare the defendant’s life.”166 On the other
hand, even double-edged mitigating evidence can be used to present a powerful case for
163

Results from the Capital Jury Project show that jurors “who believed the
defendant would be a future danger [were] more likely to vote for death . . . than [those]
who believed otherwise.” Blume, Eisenberg & Garvey, supra note 153, at 144, 165.
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-53life because of the way in which it causes the jury to empathize with the defendant.
According to John Niland, an experienced Texas capital defense attorney, if the evidence
is effectively presented, the jury may end up empathizing with the defendant or at least
feeling that they have some understanding of the difficulties he has experienced in which
case they will not be inclined to impose the death penalty.167 In all capital cases,
experienced capital defense attorneys thus invariably opt to introduce double-edged
mitigating evidence when introducing such evidence is the only means of explaining the
defendant’s life.168
B.

Arguing Lingering Doubt at the Penalty Trial

Even though arguing lingering doubt to the penalty jury is often risky,
experienced capital defense attorneys believe that there are situations in which such
arguments should be made. In deciding whether to argue lingering doubt, these attorneys
will consider various factors, including the length of the jury’s deliberations, the strength
and nature of both the government’s and the defendant’s case, the nature of the defense’s
possible penalty trial evidence, and the law of the jurisdiction relating to whether
167
168

Niland Interview, supra note 135.

Defense counsel may also be able to take measures that will neutralize the
adverse effects of potentially double-edged mitigating evidence. When dealing with
mitigating evidence that is double-edged because it suggests that the defendant is the kind
of person who would be likely to have committed the crime—the defendant’s violent or
troubled background, for example—defense counsel can sometimes argue that this
evidence provides an explanation for why the police might mistakenly suspect the
defendant of the crime. Niland Interview, supra note 135. If the mitigating evidence is
double-edged because it suggests that the defendant may pose a future danger to society,
moreover, defense counsel may be able to neutralize this evidence by introducing
evidence that shows the defendant will not pose any danger to society if he is
incarcerated for life. Evidence relating to the defendant’s prior good conduct in prisons
or other institutions, for example, may show that the defendant is dangerous only when
he is in an unstructured environment. If he is sentenced to life in prison, he will not be a
threat to anyone.

-54evidence or argument relating to lingering doubt may be introduced. In most cases, these
same factors will also play an important part in determining the content of the attorney’s
lingering doubt argument, the extent to which the attorney will introduce other mitigating
evidence, and the ways in which the attorney will interweave the arguments relating to
lingering doubt with those relating to the other evidence. In order to illustrate
experienced capital defense attorney’s strategies, I will provide examples of several
lingering doubt arguments, and then a fuller description of two penalty trial arguments,
which illustrate the context in which lingering doubt arguments are presented and the
methods through which skilled capital defense attorneys interweave these arguments with
those based on two different types of mitigating evidence.
1.

Examples of Lingering Doubt Arguments

In some cases, an experienced capital defense attorney will decide to argue
lingering doubt only if the jury’s lengthy deliberations at the guilt stage signal that at
least some of the jurors had doubts as to the defendant’s guilt of the capital offense.169
When the jury’s deliberations indicate the possibility of such doubts, the defense attorney
will advert to the jury’s deliberations in her closing argument, explaining to the jurors
that, if any of them had doubts as to the defendant’s guilt for the capital offense, this
provides a reason why they should vote against the death penalty.
This kind of argument can be effective even if the issue that precipitated lengthy
jury deliberation related to the defendant’s degree of guilt rather than his total innocence.
In a case involving William Brooks, a young African American charged with robbing,
raping, and intentionally shooting to death a young white woman, for example, Brooks’
169
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-55attorney, Stephen Bright, did not dispute that Brooks had robbed, raped, and shot the
young woman, causing her death. The defense did maintain, however, that the shooting
was accidental rather than intentional. At the guilt trial, the jury adjudicated Brooks
guilty of capital murder, but only after engaging in lengthy deliberations relating to the
question of whether the shooting was intentional or accidental.170
In his penalty trial argument, Brooks referred to the jury’s lengthy deliberations as
a reason why they should not impose the death penalty:
And we told you about the circumstances of the gun going off and
you spent a day agonizing over that and I’m sure discussing it back and
forth and you came to the decision you came to. But I’d suggest to you,
ladies and gentlemen, that part of that struggle is a reason for voting for a
life sentence in this case, the fact that it was a close question, a difficult
question, a question that obviously some of you had different views about
before you came to an ultimate agreement on it. But if there’s some
lingering question among any of you as to exactly what happened when all
those events were going on out there, that’s a reason to consider life and
vote for life because that goes to the degree of culpability and
blameworthiness in this case.171
Bright’s argument was obviously directed to the members of the jury who earlier had had
difficulty in concluding that the defendant had intentionally shot the victim. While not
criticizing those jurors’ decision to join with the majority in returning a verdict of guilty
of capital murder, Bright’s argument emphasized that each juror should reconsider
whether she had any lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt and, if she had such a
doubt, to use it as a basis for declining to vote for the death sentence.
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-56When the government’s case has obvious weaknesses—a key government witness
has been shown to be unreliable, for example—the defense attorney may decide to make
a lingering doubt argument in a way that exploits this weakness. In making this
argument, the attorney will generally be careful to avoid any express or implied criticism
of the jury’s verdict. David Bruck observes that, in such cases, he will sometimes begin
his argument relating to lingering doubt by telling the jury that, based on the evidence
they had to work with and the standard of proof they were required to apply, their verdict
was correct or at least reasonable.172 After thus making it clear that he respects the jury’s
verdict, Bruck will then explain that the jury should adopt a different perspective in
deciding whether the evidence is strong enough to warrant a death sentence.
Bruck’s lingering doubt argument on behalf of Paul Mazzell provides an apt
example. At Mazzell’s guilt trial, the chief government witness was Danny Hogg, who
testified under a grant of immunity that he and another man obeyed Mazzell’s orders to
bring the victim to Mazzell and that Mazzell alone then killed the victim. Hogg’s
testimony was impeached by his past criminal record, his own admission that he had
given false testimony at an earlier trial, and his admission that his grant of immunity
would be revoked if he himself had killed the victim.173 Three witnesses testified that
Hogg had in fact killed the victim and the prosecutor acknowledged to the jury that Hogg
was not a believable witness.174 The jury nevertheless convicted Mazzell of capital
murder.
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-57At the penalty trial, Bruck began his lingering doubt argument as follows:
I want to preface this by saying again that what I’m about to say is not to
quarrel with your verdict or say you made a mistake. You took the
evidence as it existed in the courtroom during the past week or two; and
you, consistent with your oath, applied your good judgment to that
evidence, and you found beyond a reasonable doubt that Paul was guilty.
And I’m not going to quarrel with that in any way, shape or form.
Bruck then moved to the question of how the jury should approach the evidence in
deciding the question before them at the penalty stage:
The evidence presented to you, as it had been pulled together by the State
over the last week or two, was guilty; but before you can put this man to
death based on that evidence you have to be sure of a fourth thing beyond
a reasonable doubt, and that is that the evidence that was given to you and
that you had to make do with as it had been pulled together and hammered
into shape by the time you had to deliberate, that that evidence will never,
never change. And you have to be sure of that beyond a reasonable doubt.
Y’all know exactly what I’m talking about.
You have to be sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hogg won’t come
up next month, next week, ten years from now, long after Paul has been
executed and buried and, for whatever reasons of his own, his interests
having changed, he’s not going to come along and say: “Well, I’m kind of
embarrassed to say this now, but I didn’t tell the truth at the trial.” You
have to be sure of that because, if Paul was still doing his life sentence in
prison and Mr. Hogg happened to say that, something can be done about
it; but if he’s executed, it can’t.175
Michael Burt asserts that the argument that evidence of the defendant’s guilt “may
change” has more resonance today than it did in the past because of jurors’ awareness of
cases in which convicted defendants have been exonerated. In order to draw on this
awareness, capital defense attorneys sometimes explicitly refer to cases in which
defendants convicted of capital crimes were later exonerated. The attorney may begin by
telling the jury that she respects their verdict but in reaching the judgment that an
175
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-58individual is guilty of a crime “we are dealing with human institutions that we know are
fallible.”176 The attorney may then refer to cases in which defendants convicted of
crimes were later exonerated and state that in those cases the government’s evidence
seemed to establish the defendants’ guilt and the juries that convicted those defendants
were convinced that their verdicts were correct.177
In some cases, the attorney will seek to draw even closer parallels between the
present case and prior wrongful convictions. When the prosecution’s case has obvious
weaknesses, Bruck will tell the jury that in cases in which convicted defendants were
later exonerated there were “always warning signs.”178 He will then explain some of the
types of evidence that constitute warning signs—government witnesses who change their
stories, for example, or disputed forensic evidence—and show that those same warning
signs are present in the case before them.179
In arguing lingering doubt to the penalty jury, an experienced capital defense
attorney will often assert that the jury should not impose the death penalty unless they
find that the government’s evidence meets a higher standard of proof than the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard which governed their deliberations at the guilt stage. Michael
Burt states that in California, a capital defendant’s attorney will sometimes begin
orienting jurors as to the differing standards of proof at the voir dire stage.180 The
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-59attorney may even use one or more diagrams to illustrate the different standards of proof
required at different stages of the proceedings, including perhaps reasonable suspicion to
detain the defendant, probable cause to arrest him, proof beyond a reasonable doubt to
convict him of the capital offense and proof beyond any doubt to sentence him to
death.181 After the defendant has been convicted of the capital offense, the attorney at the
penalty trial will then refer to the earlier schematic presentation and remind the jury that
they should not impose the death penalty unless the evidence of guilt meets the most
stringent standard. In some California cases, this argument will be especially effective
because the trial judge’s lingering doubt instructions will reinforce the attorney’s
argument that the prosecution’s evidence of guilt should be required to meet a higher
standard of proof at the penalty stage.182
181
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See, e.g., People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 386 (Cal. 1990) (Holding that a jury
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penalty. The adjudication of guilt is not infallible and any lingering
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839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990):
Each individual juror may consider as a mitigating factor residual or
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Lingering or residual doubt is defined as the state of mind between beyond
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-60Even when they expect no help from the judge’s instructions,183 however,
experienced capital defense attorneys will still sometimes argue that the jury should apply
a higher standard of proof before imposing a death sentence. In some jurisdictions, the
prosecutor may object to this argument on the ground that a juror’s lingering doubt as to
the defendant’s guilt does not constitute a mitigating factor that may be considered by the
penalty jury.184 But even if the judge sustains a prosecutor’s objection, the defense may
benefit. The objection will call the jury’s attention to the issue of lingering doubt and
perhaps signal to them that the prosecutor does not believe that his case has been proved
beyond any doubt. The prosecutor’s objection, moreover, may give the defense attorney

Thus if any individual juror has a lingering or residual doubt about
whether the defendant intentionally killed the victim, he or she must
consider this as a mitigating factor and assign to it the weight you deem
appropriate.
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-61an opportunity to reinforce to the jury the message that it has the ultimate responsibility
for deciding whether a death penalty should be imposed.
In the Mazzel case, for example, after pointing out to the jury that it was possible
that the chief government witnesses might later change his story,185 Bruck added that he
didn’t know whether that would happen. When he next addressed the level of proof the
jury should require to sentence the defendant to death, the prosecutor objected:
Mr. Bruck:

But before you put a man to death on their testimony, you
have to be sure beyond all doubt that it will never happen.
And that’s ridiculous. Who can be sure of that beyond all
doubt?

Mr. Stoney:

Your honor, I object. The law is not all doubt. It’s a
reasonable doubt, you Honor.

The Court:

Reasonable doubt, Mr. Bruck.

Mr. Bruck:

Yes, sir. The amount of doubt that you feel you’re willing
to tolerate before you put a man to death, of course, is
between you and your own conscience. And I won’t go
into that anymore.186

Bruck, however, did further refer to the subject of the requisite standard of proof. After
talking about mistakes that have been made in the court system, he emphatically stated,
“The death penalty is for cases where there can’t have been any kind of mistake, and this
is just not such a case.”187 After explaining why Mazzell’s case was not one in which
there couldn’t have been a mistake, moreover, Bruck adverted to the prosecutor’s earlier
objection, using it to emphasize the jury’s responsibility for determining whether a death
sentence should be imposed:
185
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-62Mr. Stoney jumps up and objects and says: “Well, its not beyond all
doubt. Its just beyond a reasonable doubt.” Well, that’s fine for him to
say, and that’s fine for the law to say; but the responsibility for whether
Paul Mazzell lives or dies is not on Mr. Stoney. Its not even on Judge
Fields. It’s on each individual one of you.188
Through this argument, Bruck effectively communicated to the jury the reasons why it
would be appropriate for them to decline to impose the death penalty unless the
prosecutor established the defendant’s guilt beyond any doubt.
2.

Two Penalty Trial Arguments

Excerpts from two penalty trial arguments provide a fuller picture of the strategic
choices skilled defense attorneys make when presenting a lingering doubt argument. In
particular, the arguments in these two cases—one from California and one from New
York—illustrate the ways in which different attorneys direct the jury’s attention to the
issue of lingering doubt, interweave arguments relating to lingering doubt with arguments
based on the introduction of mitigating evidence, and highlight the importance of
humanizing the defendant so that the jury will have a reason to spare his life.
The Henderson Case
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-63The penalty trial of Philip Henderson, who was convicted of capital murder in
California, provides an illustration of a case in which a defense attorney’s argument
relating to lingering doubt was presented in a jurisdiction that allows the fullest
consideration of lingering doubt as a mitigating factor. Henderson, who was represented
by Michael Burt and James Pagano, was charged with four counts of first degree murder
and one count of auto theft.189 The prosecution’s evidence showed that Ray and Anita
Boggs, their one-year-old child, Ray, Jr., and Anita Boggs’ unborn fetus190 were found
dead on or about February 28, 1982 in the area underneath their apartment (which was on
stilts) and in the backyard of the apartment building. Ray Boggs had been shot to death
and his wife had been strangled.191 The Boggs family had been killed about six weeks
earlier, during the second week of January, 1982, and items belonging to them had been
taken from their apartment at the time of their death.192
The police investigating the case determined that Philip Henderson and his wife
Velma had been staying at the Boggs’ apartment in January, 1982. When contacted by
the police, Henderson told them he and his wife had last seen the Boggses on January 11,
the day on which the Hendersons left San Francisco to go to Florida. Henderson did not
tell the police that he had taken Boggs’ property or that he had noticed anything unusual
in the apartment before he and his wife left for Florida.
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-64The police then discovered that Henderson and his wife had sold property that
belonged to Ray Boggs during their trip to Florida.193 In addition, witnesses noticed that
Henderson had had in his possession a .22 caliber long rifle that was similar to a rifle that
belonged to Boggs.194 A criminalist testified that the bullet retrieved from Ray Boggs’
brain was fired from a .22 caliber long rifle. While the expert could not positively
identify the rifle possessed by Henderson as the one that had fired the bullet, he testified
that the identifying characteristics of a bullet fired from that gun were “consistent with
the characteristics found on the bullet which killed Ray Boggs.”195
Henderson testified in his own defense. He denied the murders but admitted that
he and his wife stole Boggs’ property on January 11. He testified that Boggs was
involved in selling drugs and that on one occasion he had been threatened by two men,
including one called “Hawaiian Jimmy,” who beat Boggs on the head with a cane. He
testified that he and his wife decided to leave for Florida because they became frightened
by Boggs’ drug business and the violence that accompanied it.
Henderson claimed that on January 11 he and his wife had helped Ray Boggs look
for Boggs’ wife, who was missing. When they returned to the Boggs’ apartment that
evening, the apartment was in disarray and Ray Boggs’ rifle was off the rack and leaning
against the wall. The Hendersons became frightened by the circumstances and decided
this would be a good time to leave. Because they had little money, “[t]hey decided to
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-65steal the Boggs’ property.”196 Among other things, they took Ray’s rifle and truck.
Later, Henderson sold some of the stolen property. He admitted that he initially lied to
the police about his activities, his reason being that he did not want to be prosecuted for
stealing Boggs’ property.
In order to rebut the defense’s suggestion that people associated with Boggs in
selling drugs might have murdered him, Edward Ramos, also known as “Hawaiian
Jimmy,” testified for the prosecution on rebuttal. Ramos admitted threatening Boggs
with physical injury because Boggs owed him money for work he had done on Boggs’
truck; but he claimed that he never hit Boggs and that Boggs had paid him at least part of
the money he owed by giving him a $50 check on January 7, 1982.197
After five or six days of deliberations, the jury found Henderson guilty of two
counts of capital murder and several lesser crimes. Because the defense had presented a
strong claim of innocence at the guilt trial, Henderson’s attorneys decided to present
evidence and argument relating to lingering doubt at the penalty trial.
During the penalty trial, the defense introduced evidence relating to the
defendant’s guilt that had not been admitted during the guilt trial. Most significantly,
Rose Marie Hunt,
who was close friends with the Boggses, the godmother to the Boggses’ one-year-old
child, and knew not only the Hendersons and the Bogges but also the other people who
were associated with both families during the period when the murders occurred, was
allowed to give her opinion as to the appropriate penalty for Henderson. She testified
196
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Id. He also testified that “[a] few weeks later” he attempted “to collect the rest
of the money [Boggs] owed.” Id.

-66that in her opinion Mr. Henderson should be given a life sentence because “there’s other
parties involved in this that hasn’t been brought forth.”198 Asked to explain, she broke
down in tears and testified from her wheelchair, “I believe that if he’s executed in the gas
chamber he may be executed as an innocent victim. And I believe at that time when the
true people have (been) found out, there will be no way to bring him back to life like
there is no way to bring my friends back to life. I believe that if he is put to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole, that if he is guilty, then he’s punished. If he
is not guilty, he has the possibility of coming out and the real people being convicted.”199
She also quite dramatically testified that, following her testimony in the guilt phase for
Mr. Henderson, her life had been threatened by one of “Hawaiian Jimmy’s” friends.200
Other witnesses who knew Henderson also testified that in each of their opinions
Henderson was not guilty of the killings that had been committed.201
During his closing argument at the penalty trial, the prosecutor specifically
addressed the issue of lingering doubt. He first referred to the testimony of the witnesses
who expressed the opinion that Henderson was not guilty. He argued that these witnesses
lacked the knowledge necessary for an informed opinion. He pointed out that some of
the witnesses could not assess the defendant’s propensities at the time of the crime
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-67because they had not seen him for many years.202 In the case of Ms. Hunt, he emphasized
that she had not attended the guilt trial. He then said:
She didn’t listen to the evidence. She didn’t consider that evidence.
That’s like someone being a Monday morning quarterback who didn’t
even watch the game the day before. I object to that. I think that’s real
inappropriate.203
After thus seeking to dismiss the testimony of the defense’s lingering doubt
witnesses, the prosecutor argued that the jury’s verdict at the guilt stage should preclude
the defense from establishing lingering doubt as a mitigating factor:
Now, if there is a doubt in your mind, I like to think—I like to think that
you’ll resolve that in the guilt phase. And I think you did on certain of the
offenses. I think you gave the defendant every benefit of every doubt that
he was ever able to get. . . . But I submit to you any doubt was resolved in
that jury room in the guilt phase. And I’ll submit to you that it’s rather,
it’s rather a strong word, and I apologize, but it’s rather insulting to get up
here and say may be you were wrong, just may be you were a tiny bit.204
Consistent with the empirical data relating to capital jurors’ attitudes,205 the prosecutor’s
assertion that defense counsel’s lingering doubt argument was “insulting” seemed
designed to lead the jury to weigh that argument against the defendant because it
represented a refusal on the part of the defense to accept the jury’s verdict.206
The prosecutor’s primary argument, however, was that the jury should view their
verdict at the guilt stage as foreclosing any doubts as to the defendant’s guilt. After
202
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-68characterizing the lingering doubt argument as insulting, the prosecutor returned to this
theme:
People have to make decisions. If we never made decisions, we would
never move. Some of you in occupations make decisions, life and death
decisions on a daily basis. You have to make decisions. You made your
decision, let’s go with it now. If you going to return a verdict of life
without possibility of parole, I hope you do it for other than lingering
doubt. I think that is selling yourself short. That is a cop out.207

The prosecutor thus continually sought to reinforce the idea that, through its verdict at the
guilt stage, the jury had resolved all doubts against the defendant.
Defense counsel James Pagano, who had not participated in the guilt trial but was
the primary attorney during the penalty trial,208 made the final argument to the penalty
jury.209 Early in the argument, Pagano referred to the jury’s lengthy deliberations,
observing that it showed they were “serious about [their] job.”210 A little later, he
specifically responded to the prosecutor’s argument relating to lingering doubt,
emphasizing that a higher standard of proof should be required to impose the death
penalty:
And in spite of what counsel said, lingering doubt is very valid here
especially in the facts and circumstances of this case. . . . You can find
somebody guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we explained that to you in
the voir dire. There is that higher area, just that little bit more. And they
allow you because this is the death penalty case.211
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-69-

Consistent with David Bruck’s approach,212 Pagano next asked the jury to visualize how
the case might look to them in the future:
And you can say yes, I believe I found this is the guy, that did it beyond a
reasonable doubt, but would you five years from now, ten years from now,
20 years from now, this is the guy that did it, he really did it.213
Having developed the framework for arguing lingering doubt, Pagano proceeded
to argue that specific aspects of the case “cried [out] for lingering doubt.”214 He argued,
for example, that the jury should give weight to Rose Marie Hunt’s opinion:
[N]obody knows the cast of characters that hung out at 753 Webster Street
or that other milieu down at Jack In The Box better than Rose Marie Hunt.
And the child’s godmother is telling you you may have the wrong person
here, better give it some attention.215
He also argued that, in view of the circumstantial nature of the government’s case, the
jury should give weight to the witnesses who testified as to Henderson’s non-violent
character:
There is no smoking gun here and it is circumstantial evidence.
Mr. Henderson was on trial. It was reasonable for you to conclude,
perhaps, what you did. But now in the penalty phase you’ve got to know a
little bit more about Phil Henderson.216
During the rest of his argument, Pagano talked primarily about the defense witnesses who
had testified on Henderson’s behalf at the penalty trial. Since this testimony could
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-70accurately be characterized as “good guy” evidence,217 Pagano was able to effectively
interweave two interrelated arguments: the witnesses’ testimony showed that
Henderson’s was “a life worth sparing” and that “[t]here [was] a lingering doubt” as to
his guilt.218
During the latter part of his argument, Pagano focused primarily on the penalty
trial evidence relating to Henderson’s background and character. He talked about
Henderson’s life, including the people who cared about him, his non-violent character
and his kindness to children. Through this argument, Pagano sought to humanize
Henderson and to convince the jury that his life was worth sparing. Pagano also referred
to testimony that indicated Henderson would not be a threat to anyone if he were
incarcerated for life.219 He ended by urging the jury to accept the alternative of life
imprisonment in this case.220
In accordance with California law, the judge instructed the jury that, in deciding
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, one of the mitigating factors they
could consider was “any lingering doubt you may have about his guilt.”221 After a
relatively short deliberation, the jury returned a sentence of life without possibility of
parole.222
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-71The McIntosh Case
The penalty trial of Dalkeith McIntosh, who was convicted of capital murder in
New York, is noteworthy for at least two reasons: first, the defense’s counsel lingering
doubt argument was unorthodox but highly effective, thus demonstrating that skilled
capital defense attorneys will adopt different approaches depending on myriad
circumstances, including the attorney’s sense of the rapport she has been able to establish
with the jury; second, the case provides a striking example of one in which the defense
elected to introduce “double-edged” mitigating evidence at the penalty trial and the
defense attorney’s closing argument, which interweaved appeals to “lingering doubt”
with a narration of the defendant’s history, provided powerful support for the axiom that,
whether or not there is an issue of lingering doubt, mitigating evidence explaining the
defendant’s background and history must be presented to the penalty jury.
McIntosh was charged with two murders and felonious assault. The prosecution
claimed that he shot his estranged wife, who was a corrections officer, one of her
daughters and her six-year-old grandson. While the six year old survived and testified
against McIntosh, the two women died. McIntosh had previously been charged with
assault in a domestic incident involving his estranged wife; the prosecution’s theory was
that McIntosh killed his wife to prevent her from testifying against him in the assault case
and then shot the others because they witnessed his murder of his wife.223 McIntosh also
had several other prior convictions, including at least one for assault and battery and
some for marihuana offenses.224
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-72The shootings took place on a secluded street in a sparsely populated area just
outside Poughkeepsie, New York. At the time of the shooting, the three victims were in a
Volkswagen bug, which was stopped in the middle of the street. A motorist driving in
the opposite direction arrived just as the shooter, a black male, fled into a wooded area on
the large grounds of a closed state psychiatric hospital. Police responded quickly. About
a half hour later, an officer on the opposite side of the hospital grounds saw McIntosh
walking toward town through a swamp. When he asked McIntosh to stop, McIntosh ran
and the pursuing officer eventually placed him under arrest.
The six-year-old witness identified McIntosh as the shooter. McIntosh’s principal
trial attorney, William Tendy, argued that this child, who had a long history of mental
and emotional disorders, was highly vulnerable to suggestion and that the circumstances
under which he identified McIntosh made the identification unreliable. To support the
child’s identification, the government also presented evidence that, more than a year after
the crime, an environmental clean-up crew clearing the swamp where McIntosh was seen
by the police found a no-longer-operable handgun and an FBI analyst testified that the
bullet lead in this handgun matched the lead in the slugs that killed the victims. Since the
swamp had been thoroughly searched at the time of McIntosh’s arrest, Tendy vigorously
attacked the government’s effort to establish a connection between McIntosh and the
newly discovered murder weapon. At the conclusion of the guilt trial, McIntosh was
convicted of four counts of capital murder.225
225

Two involved the intentional murder of his estranged wife and her daughter in
the same transaction that involved the intentional murder of the other, see N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 400.27(3) (Consol. 2003), and two involving the intentional killing of his
estranged wife’s daughter to prevent her from testifying as a witness to the murder of his
estranged wife and the attempted murder of her grandson. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 400.27(3) (Consol. 2003).

-73At the penalty trial, Tendy made both the opening statement and closing argument
to the jury. Early in his opening statement, he told the jury he was “going to be honest
with” them and “do things some people told me not to do.”226 He then said,
I disagree with your verdict. I have to say that. I know I’m not supposed
to. I know it’s not something you want to hear, but its something I’m
going to say. I have tried to be as honest with you as I can. I hope you
respect that. I know you have been honest with us, especially with me,
and I respect that as well. So I accept your verdict. I have to. I’m no use
to this man if I don’t. I accept it. I understand it, I respect it, but I
disagree with it.227
As Tendy indicated, his statement was contrary to the orthodox view that the defendant’s
attorney should not risk antagonizing the penalty jury by expressing disagreement with
their verdict.228 By emphasizing his “respect” for the jury and their verdict, however,
Tendy sought to deflect any hostile reaction to his statement. Since he had already
established a good rapport with the jury, moreover, his openness and candor may have
had the effect of enhancing rather than diminishing the jury’s confidence in him.
After some further comments relating to his disappointment with the jury’s
verdict,229 Tendy stated that the purpose of the penalty trial was “to decide if this man
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At Tendy’s request, the judge asked the jury whether the fact that they had
rejected Tendy’s arguments during the guilt stage would affect their ability to listen to his
arguments at the penalty stage. Tendy’s Opening Statement, supra note 226, at 30. In
addition to explaining his feelings about the jury’s verdict, Tendy in his opening
statement elaborated as to the significance of this question. Id.

-74lives or dies.”230 In explaining how the jury should approach this decision, he referred to
the fact that a juror’s lingering doubt could be a basis for voting against the death
penalty.231 He also told the jury that the defense would present witnesses that would
enable them to “learn a little bit about this man.”232
Tendy then provided an overview of the defendant’s life story and alluded to the
conflict between himself and the defendant with respect to presenting this story to the
jury:
It’s a very, very sad story. He doesn’t want it told. This man doesn’t want
this story told, he doesn’t want to hear it, and I have taken that decision
away from him. There’s some painful memories here. . . . I think . . . that
his punishment really began the day that he was born and will continue
until the day he dies.233
During the penalty trial, the defense presented witnesses who developed the salient
details of McIntosh’s sad story, which included an impoverished childhood in Jamaica,
horrendous child abuse, and the defendant’s struggles to overcome severe mental and
physical problems.
Some of this evidence was certainly “double-edged” in the sense that it might lead
the jury to believe that the defendant’s prolonged exposure to abuse and violence would
enhance his propensity towards violence, thereby increasing both the jury’s confidence in
their earlier guilty verdict and their sense that, if McIntosh’s life was spared, he might be
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-75dangerous in the future.234 Nevertheless, the defense presented McIntosh’s tragic life
story in graphic detail. In his final argument to the jury, moreover, Tendy emphasized
some of the most horrendous aspects of McIntosh’s history:
This man was born to a mother who never wanted him and a father who
abandoned him. . . . All he ever knew was hatred and cruelty. That’s
what he was raised on. He had a stutter so bad that he was afraid to speak,
and when he did everybody laughed at him, taunted him, and he became
so afraid that finally he shut down, stopped talking as child. . . . And
brutalized beyond anything that I could ever imagine. Whipped until he
was cut and bleeding, whipped with sticks soaked in salt water so when
the cuts were there they would burn from the salt. . . . This was a small
child. This is mitigation.235
Later in his argument, Tendy reiterated that he didn’t “believe [McIntosh]
committed these crimes.”236 Nevertheless, he also made a powerful statement explaining
why McIntosh’s tragic history should be relevant to the jury’s sentencing decision. He
told the jury that to make that decision they needed “to walk in this man’s footsteps.”237
In recounting those footsteps, he focused especially on the significance of the brutal child
abuse:
If your mother savagely beat you as a child, took out a whip and whipped
you with it until your skin bled, until your skin was cut and salt got into
the wound and made it burn, if she took a board and beat you with it, took
a pot and hit you with it until your head was bleeding, and she took your
head and slammed it against walls, and if she took a wooden board with a
234

Introducing the evidence, moreover, opened up the possibility that the jury
would learn of McIntosh’s prior convictions, including his prior conviction for assault
and battery. See text at supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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-76nail in it and beat you while your flesh was being cut, telling you she
wants you dead, tell me where would you all be right now? You want to
talk about a choice?238
In this part of the argument, Tendy’s point seemed to be that the abuse McIntosh
suffered impaired his capacity to govern his conduct, thus reducing his culpability for the
crimes he may have committed. Although this argument—and the vivid description of
the abuse that supported it—could have had the potential for undercutting Tendy’s
arguments based on lingering doubt, Tendy obviously believed that that was a risk worth
taking. In order to humanize McIntosh, Tendy presented the full history of McIntosh’s
childhood so that the jury would be able to see not only the man Dalkeith McIntosh but
“also that little boy.”239
In charging the jury, the judge in McIntosh’s case said nothing about “lingering
doubt” but, in accordance with New York law, told them that they could return a life
sentence even if they found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. After fairly short deliberations, the jury returned with a sentence of life
with no possibility of parole.240
V. The Standards For Evaluating Strategic Choices by Attorneys Representing
Capital Defendants With a Strong Claim of Innocence
In this Part, I will address the three issues left unresolved by Wiggins. Drawing
from the material presented in Parts III and IV, I will seek to articulate axioms that
govern the strategic choices of experienced capital defense attorneys when they are
representing capital defendants with strong claims of innocence. Based on not only the
238
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-77material presented in these Parts but also the ABA Guidelines, lower court cases, and, to
some extent, the implications of Wiggins’ analysis, I will contend that these axioms
should also define the standard of care that must be met by an attorney who is
representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence.
A. The Attorney’s Obligation to Investigate for Reasonably Available
Mitigating Evidence
In Wiggins, the Court placed its imprimatur on the provision of the ABA
Guidelines which provides that an attorney representing a capital defendant has an
obligation to investigate for “all reasonably available mitigating evidence.” In Wiggins,
of course, it was obvious that the mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s social
history was “reasonably available” not only in that it could be obtained but also in that it
could be obtained without placing an additional strain on the other resources available to
the defense for investigation.241 In other situations, however, attorneys representing
capital defendants with strong claims of innocence may have to confront difficult choices
relating to resource allocation.
If the attorney believes that the defense needs substantial resources to support the
defendant’s claim of innocence, she may know from experience that the judge who
allocates resources for defense investigation will not allocate sufficient resources to allow
both what the attorney believes is necessary to prepare for the guilt trial and what is
necessary to obtain the kind of in-depth social history of the defendant that would
produce powerful mitigating evidence. If the judge has already granted the attorney
substantial funds for investigation that will support the defendant’s alibi, for example, the
attorney may know that the judge will not allocate funds for the mental retardation expert
241

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

-78that the defense attorney believes is necessary to provide a meaningful analysis of the
mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s possible mental retardation. Or the
attorney may know that, given the resources already allocated to the defense, the judge
will sharply limit the hourly rate to be paid to a mental health expert, thus rendering it
impossible for the defense to obtain the kind of mitigating evidence relating to the
defendant’s mental impairment that a more highly skilled mental health expert would be
able to provide. In these situations, what should be the effect of the attorney’s obligation
to investigate for “all reasonably available mitigating evidence?”
When the resources available for a capital defendant’s defense are limited, the
defendant’s attorney will undoubtedly have to make difficult decisions relating to
resource allocation. The defense attorney’s obligation to investigate for available
mitigating evidence, moreover, does not mean that she must curtail the investigation
relating to the guilt trial in order to fulfill this obligation. The attorney may reasonably
decide to obtain funds for a forensics expert that she believes will enhance the
defendant’s defense at the guilt stage, for example, even if she knows that in practice this
will make it impossible for her to obtain the funds necessary to conduct an investigation
for mitigating evidence that would allow an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s
possible mental impairment.
But even if the attorney’s choices make it impossible for her to obtain the
resources necessary to conduct a full investigation for the potentially available mitigating
evidence, she should make a record showing that she has sought such an investigation.242
242

If the attorney believes allocating resources for the purpose of strengthening the
defendant’s case at the guilt trial must be the defense’s first priority, she will generally be
able to make that priority clear through presenting motions relating to these issues prior
to her motions that are designed to obtain a full investigation for mitigating evidence.

-79At a minimum, she should request that the court appoint a social worker (or other
mitigation expert) who can conduct a full investigation relating to the defendant’s social
history. Depending on the circumstances, she should also request funds that will allow an
adequate investigation relating to the other areas that, as Wiggins noted,243 the ABA
Guidelines have identified as providing sources for mitigating evidence.244 These include
the defendant’s “medical history, educational history, employment and training history,
. . . prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural
influences.”245 In some cases, for example, the attorney might be able to show the need
for a mental health expert to conduct a meaningful investigation into the defendant’s
medical background or an expert in a specific culture to investigate the effect of religious
or cultural influences on his conduct.246
Through requesting these resources, the defense attorney would make a record as
to the type of investigation she believed to be necessary to present the “available”
mitigating evidence. The attorney’s request, moreover, would alert the judge as to the
extent and nature of potentially mitigating evidence. If the judge denied some or all of
the attorney’s request and the defendant subsequently received a death sentence, the
243
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Id. (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline
11.8.6, 133 (1989)).
246

See, e.g., Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding counsel
ineffective due to failure to conduct investigation that would have produced, inter alia,
expert testimony about the difficulty of adolescent immigrants from Hong Kong
assimilating to North America; this evidence would have humanized the defendant and
could have resulted in a life sentence, even though the defendant had been convicted of
13 murders).

-80defense would then be able to raise on appeal the question whether the capital defendant
was provided with adequate resources to present the available mitigating evidence at the
penalty trial. In some cases, the attorney would have a strong argument that, based on
Ake v. Oklahoma,247 the court’s failure to provide adequate compensation for the experts
needed to assist the defense in obtaining “any reasonably mitigating evidence” violated
the defendant’s right to due process.248 In all cases, moreover, the attorney would have
fulfilled her obligation to seek such evidence and the scope of the system’s obligation to
provide adequate resources for the necessary investigation would be presented as a
question to be decided by the reviewing courts.249
B. The Attorney’s Obligation to Investigate for Mitigating Evidence
When the Defendant Instructs Her to the Contrary
The ABA Guidelines directly speak to the situation in which the capital defendant
instructs his attorney not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty trial. In a sentence
that appears immediately before the portion of the Guidelines relied on in Wiggins to
establish a capital defense attorney’s obligation to investigate for “all reasonably
available mitigating evidence,” the 1989 Guidelines provide that “[t]he investigation for
the preparation of the sentencing phase should be conducted regardless of any initial
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Wiggins appears to recognize that introducing “any available mitigating
evidence” will be critical factor for the defense in many, if not most, capital cases.
Whether Ake requires compensation for the expert requested by the defense should thus
depend on whether the defense can make a sufficient showing that the expert is necessary
to assist in obtaining or evaluating such evidence.

-81assertion by the client that mitigation should not be offered.”250 At least as to a capital
defense attorney’s obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence, the Wiggins majority
appeared to accept the ABA Guidelines as establishing “norms” for competent
representation by capital defendants’ attorneys. Unless there is some basis for rejecting
the ABA Guidelines’ statement that a capital defense counsel has an obligation to
investigate despite her client’s initial instructions to the contrary, this portion of the
Guidelines should also be viewed as establishing the standard for competent performance
in capital cases.
The strongest argument for rejecting this provision of the ABA Guidelines is that
it needlessly interferes with a capital defendant’s autonomy. As I have indicated,251 a
capital defendant has the right to make a binding decision as to what, if any, mitigating
evidence will be introduced at the penalty trial. Since the attorney must respect her
client’s choice to have no mitigating evidence introduced at the penalty trial, why should
it not at least be competent representation for her to comply with the client’s direction not
to investigate for mitigating evidence? Arguably, there will be no need to investigate for
mitigating evidence if it has already been decided that mitigating evidence will not be
introduced at the penalty trial.252
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 11.4.1(c), 93 (1989).
In February, 2003, the American Bar Association updated these Guidelines to read “[t]he
investigation regarding penalty should be conducted regardless of any statement by the
client that evidence bearing upon penalty is not to be collected or presented.” AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 10.7.A.2, 76 (2003).
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As Michael Burt observed, however, investigation for evidence relating to the
defendant’s social history will often reveal evidence that will strengthen the defendant’s

-82The ABA Guidelines seem to be predicated on the view that, unless the attorney
conducts a full investigation of potential mitigating evidence prior to trial, the defendant
will not be able to make an informed decision as to the sentencing strategy to be pursued
at the penalty trial.253 Lower courts addressing the attorney’s constitutional obligation to
investigate for mitigating evidence despite the defendant’s contrary instructions have
focused on this issue.
Citing the ABA Guidelines’ language, the Sixth Circuit has held that a full
investigation for mitigating evidence “should be conducted regardless of any initial
assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be offered.”254 Without citing the
Guidelines, the 10th Circuit reached a similar result in a case in which a capital
defendant’s attorney justified his failure to investigate for mitigating evidence by

case at the guilt trial. See note 133, supra and accompanying text. Since defense counsel
cannot predict in advance what this investigation will produce, moreover, she will
generally not be able to assess the likelihood that it will yield such evidence. In most
cases, the defense attorney should thus be required to insist on at least some investigation
for mitigating evidence in order to prepare for the guilt trial in the capital case.
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According to the 1989 ABA Guidelines, an attorney must first investigate and
“evaluate the potential avenues of action and then advise the client on the merits of each.”
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Commentary to Guidelines
11.4.1, 96 (1989). The most recent version of the Guidelines states that “[c]ounsel
cannot reasonably advise a client about the merits of different courses of action, the client
cannot make informed decisions, and counsel cannot be sure of the client’s competency
to make such decisions, unless counsel has first conducted a thorough investigation.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Commentary toGuideline 10.7,
80-81 (2003).
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-83asserting he was complying with his client’s instructions.255 The Sixth Circuit concluded
that, unless the attorney investigated for mitigating evidence, the defendant would have
no “understanding of competing mitigating strategies,”256 and thus be unable to make an
informed decision as to the proper sentencing strategy. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the defendant would be unable to make an informed choice because the
attorney’s “failure to investigate clearly affected his ability to competently advise [his
client] regarding the meaning of mitigation evidence and the availability of possible
mitigating strategies.”257
Other cases have held, however, that an attorney may comply with her client’s
directions to abandon investigation for mitigating evidence so long as the attorney
adequately advises the defendant regarding the consequences of not investigating.258 The
Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that “a lawyer who abandons investigation into
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availability of possible mitigation strategies”).
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See, e.g., Williams v. Calderon, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1050 (C.D. CA 1998)
(holding that a capital defendant’s attorney’s failure to investigate for mitigating evidence
was reasonable when the defendant informed him that no evidence should be presented at
the penalty trial and that, before accepting these instructions, the attorney “discussed the
purpose of mitigation evidence with [the defendant] and [explained] . . . a what evidence
could have been presented”); Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1998)
(holding that a capital defendant’s attorney’s failure to investigate for mitigating evidence
was reasonable when the attorney followed the defendant’s instructions to neither
investigate nor present mitigating evidence and the defendant remained firm in his
instructions even even after the attorney informed him “about the importance of and the
need to investigate” for mitigating evidence). See also cases cited in note 263, infra.

-84mitigating evidence in a capital case must at least have adequately informed his client of
the potential consequences of that decision and must be assured that his client has made
[an] informed and knowing judgment.”259 When the attorney apprises the defendant “of
the importance of presenting mitigating evidence,”260 the court has determined that the
attorney acted reasonably in following the defendant’s decision not to investigate.261
Will a capital defendant who has instructed the attorney not to investigate for
mitigating evidence be able to make an informed decision relating to sentencing strategy
after the attorney fully explains the potential significance of mitigating evidence? It
might depend on the reasons for the defendant’s original instructions. A defendant who
believes investigating for mitigating evidence is unnecessary because he won’t be
convicted of the capital offense obviously presents a different problem than one who
prefers a sentence of death over one of life imprisonment. Arguably, the latter defendant
is in a better position to make an informed choice relating to sentencing strategy.262
But whether the reasons for the defendant’s instructions emanate from his
judgment as to the appropriate litigation strategy or his indifference to avoiding
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Even if a seemingly competent defendant expresses this preference, his
attorney must be alert to the possibility that the defendant may change his mind and that
his “choice is made without a full appreciation of the consequences.” Bright Email,
supra note 117.

-85execution, the attorney will almost invariably have good reason to believe that the
defendant will be unable to make an informed decision with respect to whether mitigating
evidence should be presented at the penalty trial until after the attorney has conducted a
full investigation for any available mitigating evidence.
If the defendant’s instructions are based on the view that mitigating evidence will
not assist the defense, the attorney’s response should be that, at least in the absence of
data gleaned from the investigation, the defendant lacks the knowledge necessary to
make that judgment. Prior to the beginning of a capital trial, no defendant—no matter
how knowledgeable—will be able to predict whether or not he will be convicted of the
capital offense. In the absence of evaluating the mitigating evidence that could be
produced at the penalty trial, moreover, the defendant lacks the information necessary to
make an informed decision as to whether introducing mitigating evidence at the penalty
trial could lead the penalty jury to spare his life.
If the defendant’s reason for his instructions is that he prefers execution over life
imprisonment or that he prefers execution over subjecting his family and friends to the
aggravation of supplying mitigating evidence, determining the scope of the attorney’s
obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence is more difficult. If a competent capital
defendant makes an informed decision to seek execution rather than life imprisonment at
the penalty trial, the defense attorney is required to respect that decision.263 If the
attorney’s decision to opt for execution in the event of conviction should be viewed as an
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See, e.g., Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1998). It should follow,
moreover, that the attorney should also be required to respect a defendant’s informed
decision to opt for execution rather seeking a life sentence under circumstances that he
views as imposing intolerable burdens for either himself or his loved ones.

-86informed decision as to the objective to be pursued at the penalty trial, the attorney
should thus be required to respect that decision.
A defense attorney should not assume, however, that a capital defendant’s pretrial
decision to opt for a death sentence at the penalty trial, in the event it occurs, is a fully
informed decision. When confronted with a capital trial, a defendant, especially one who
claims he is innocent, will be much more likely to be focused on the guilt trial at which
he may be acquitted than on a penalty trial, which will take place only if he is convicted
of a capital offense. In most cases, it is thus reasonable to assume that the defendant will
not be able to make an informed decision as to the objective to be pursued at the penalty
trial until the jury’s verdict at the guilt trial forces him to confront the reality of that trial.
In order to insure that a capital defendant can make a fully informed decision as to
whether to seek a sentence of life imprisonment or death at the penalty trial, the
defendant’s attorney should thus provide the defendant with the opportunity to make his
final decision only after the verdict at the guilt stage forces the defendant to focus on the
stark available sentencing alternatives. In order to provide the defendant with a
meaningful opportunity to make a decision at this stage, however, the attorney would
ordinarily have had to conduct a full investigation for available mitigating evidence prior
to the guilt stage. Otherwise, if the defendant’s final decision is that he wants to seek a
life sentence at the penalty trial, the attorney will not ordinarily have sufficient time to
find the mitigating evidence that she would need to introduce in order to maximize the
chances of obtaining that objective.
Accordingly, if a capital defendant instructs his attorney prior to trial either not to
investigate or to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence, the attorney should

-87nevertheless have an obligation to investigate for all reasonably available mitigating
evidence. Failure to comply with this obligation, moreover, should constitute deficient
performance within the meaning of the first prong of the Strickland test.
C. The Attorney’s Obligation to Make a Reasonable Strategic Decision
Relating to Potential Mitigating Evidence
Wiggins’ analysis indicated that a defense attorney’s strategic decision to curtail
investigation for mitigating evidence because she wants to focus primarily or exclusively
on reasserting the capital defendant’s innocence at the penalty trial must be subjected to
constitutional scrutiny. Justice O’Connor recognized that, prior to conducting a full
investigation for mitigating evidence, an attorney may not reasonably conclude that
introducing such evidence would be unnecessary or counter-productive because the
argument based on the defendant’s innocence is so strong. Rather, her opinion
recognized that, when the potential mitigating evidence is persuasive and not doubleedged, combining the mitigating evidence with evidence or argument relating to the
defendant’s innocence will be likely to be a more effective sentencing strategy than
relying solely on reasserting the defendant’s innocence.264
Through its citation to earlier cases,265 Wiggins indicated that a capital
defendant’s attorney’s decision to curtail investigation will be a reasonable strategic
choice if the attorney’s preliminary investigation justifies a conclusion that introducing
the potentially available mitigating evidence would be unhelpful or counter-productive.
Under what circumstances can an attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong
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See Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2537 (citing Strickland v. Washington, supra;
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987)).

-88claim of innocence reasonably reach this conclusion? More specifically, when may such
an attorney reasonably conclude that the investigation for mitigating evidence can be
abandoned because the evidence likely to be found will be double-edged in the sense that
it may convince the jury either that the defendant’s guilt for the offense of which he was
convicted is more certain or his potential danger to society is increased?
Based on Wiggins itself, a capital defendant’s attorney cannot reasonably
conclude that introducing mitigating evidence relating to a defendant’s troubled
childhood or severe mental problems would be so double-edged that the attorney can
curtail investigation for such evidence. In discussing the Wiggins’ attorneys’ sentencing
strategy, Justice O’Connor emphasized that the mitigating evidence available in Wiggins
did not show that Wiggins had previously engaged in violent conduct.266 She thus
concluded that the evidence “contained little of the double edge”267 and intimated that
introducing it at the penalty trial would have been compatible with their strategy of
reasserting the defendant’s innocence.
Although Wiggins thus suggested that a capital defendant’s attorney could make a
reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence when the
preliminary investigation revealed that the defendant had engaged in prior violent
conduct,268 the ABA Guidelines do not provide that the attorney should abandon the
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In addition to explaining that the mitigating evidence in Wiggins did not show
prior violent conduct, the Court also distinguished its holding in Darden v. Wainwright.
In Darden, the Court held that counsel can reasonably curtail investigation when “the
decision to present a mitigation case would . . . [result] in the jury hearing evidence that
[the defendant] had been convicted of violent crimes and spent much of his life in jail.”
123 S. Ct. at 2537. However, Wiggins’ attorneys “uncovered [nothing] in their

-89investigation for any such reason.269 And the material presented in Parts III and IV of
this article indicate that experienced capital defense attorneys would certainly not curtail
the investigation into the defendant’s background because of concerns that tracing his
social history would reveal that he engaged in violent or other anti-social conduct.
In the McIntosh case, for example, the defendant’s attorney certainly had reason
to believe that, based on the defendant’s prolonged exposure to violence during his
childhood, investigation of his background might reveal that he had engaged in violent
behavior as an adult. In fact, the investigation for mitigation evidence showed that the
defendant had engaged in such conduct and had at least one assault and battery
conviction.270 McIntosh’s attorneys, however, never considered the possibility of not
presenting that mitigating evidence because of a concern that the jury would then view
McIntosh as a more violent person. Introducing evidence that would provide the jury
with a full picture of the defendant’s troubled history was an indispensable aspect of their
sentencing strategy.
In fact, skilled capital defense attorneys uniformly agree that, regardless of
whether the defendant has a strong claim of innocence at the guilt trial, the defense
attorney must present mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s background at the
penalty trial. If the defendant’s background includes prior violent conduct, obviously the
investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been
counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless.” Id.
269

The ABA Guidelines state that “[u]nless a plea bargain has resulted in a
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sentencing trial must be made in every case.” AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA
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-90attorney does not want to emphasize this (or allow the prosecutor to emphasize it) at the
penalty trial. Nevertheless, an experienced capital defense attorney would never curtail
investigation for mitigating evidence simply because she is aware that it will uncover
evidence showing the defendant has engaged in prior violent conduct.
The investigation should be conducted because it may reveal other mitigating
evidence that can be introduced without exposing the jury to the defendant’s prior violent
conduct.271 Moreover, even if no such evidence is discovered, an experienced capital
defense attorney will invariably opt to introduce mitigating evidence that provides the
jury with an opportunity to “walk in the defendant’s footsteps,”272 regardless of whether
it also exposes them to the defendant’s prior violent or anti-social conduct.273 As Stephen
Bright said, if the attorney does not “humanize” the defendant by presenting a nuanced
narrative of his past, the penalty jury will be likely to feel that it has no reason to spare
the defendant’s life.274
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In some cases, for example, the defendant’s attorney would be able to introduce
mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s troubled childhood without opening the
door for the introduction of violent acts committed by the defendant when he was an
adult.
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Michael Burt stated that he would not be concerned about introducing
background evidence that would expose the jury to the defendant’s prior violent conduct
unless it “opened up the possibility of the prosecutor admitting aggravating
circumstances, that would be commensurate with the crime charged.” Burt Interview,
supra note 119. Thus, the defense should be concerned if admitting mitigating evidence
would allow the prosecution to show he had previously been involved in a murder or
attempted murder but should not be concerned if the prosecutor could only be able to
show that the defendant had previously been involved in burglaries, assaults, or other
charges significantly less serious than the capital charge.
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-91While Wiggins did not hold that a defense attorney representing a capital
defendant with a strong claim of innocence can never make a reasonable strategic
decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence, it indicated that professional
norms for capital defense attorneys are expressed in the ABA Guidelines, which in turn
reflect the practices of skilled and experienced capital defense attorneys. Based on these
norms, an attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence can
never make a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating
evidence. Such a decision should invariably constitute deficient performance under the
first prong of the Strickland test.
VI.

Conclusion
Even those who favor the death penalty believe that our system of capital

punishment should operate so that the risk of executing an innocent person is minimized.
Data showing that innocent defendants have frequently been convicted and sentenced to
death has therefore provoked increasing public concern. When so many innocent
defendants are on death row, it is almost inevitable that some will not be exonerated in
time to avoid execution. As Justice O’Connor stated in a speech given in 2001, “if
statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants
to be executed.”275
Unfortunately, the strategies employed by some attorneys who represent capital
defendants with strong claims of innocence may exacerbate the extent to which innocent
defendants are sentenced to death. When an attorney representing a capital defendant
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-92with a strong claim of innocence focuses primarily or exclusively on seeking to obtain an
acquittal at the guilt trial, the attorney’s tactics may increase the likelihood that the jury
will sentence the defendant to death in the event that they find him guilty of the capital
offense. Although a jury’s lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt can be a strong
factor in producing a life sentence, defense attorneys are inclined to overestimate the
likelihood that the death-qualified jury that convicted the defendant will in fact have a
lingering doubt as to his guilt. If the jury has no lingering doubt as to the defendant’s
guilt and the defense attorney introduces little or no mitigating evidence at the penalty
trial, the penalty jury will be likely to conclude that there is no reason to spare the
defendant’s life. As a result, death penalties are likely to be disproportionately imposed
in cases as to which the defendants’ attorneys believe the defendants have strong claims
of innocence, a pool of cases which, of course, includes many if not most of those in
which the defendants are actually innocent.276
With respect to monitoring defense attorneys’ representation of capital
defendants, the Court’s decision in Wiggins is certainly a positive development.
Although Wiggins’ holding could be confined to the specific ineffective assistance of
counsel claim before it in that case, the Court’s analysis may have been animated, at least
in part, by its recognition of specific concerns relating to the application of our system of
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In some cases involving defendants who are actually innocent, the evidence
presented at trial may appear to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond any reasonable
doubt. This may occur, for example, when the government introduces the defendant’s
false confession into evidence and the defendant’s attorney fails to present any persuasive
reasons for disbelieving the confession. For a description of one such case, see Eric M.
Freedman, Earl Washington’s Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089 (2001) (describing the
case of Earl Washington, Jr., a mentally retarded defendant who was convicted and
sentenced to death on the basis of his false confession to the rape and murder of a young
woman).

-93capital punishment, including not only attorneys’ inadequate representation of capital
defendants but also the risk of executing an innocent defendant. If so, then the fact that
Wiggins involved a defendant with a strong claim of innocence may have been
significant. The Court’s holding could provide at least a first step towards decreasing the
likelihood that defendants with strong claims of innocence will be sentenced to death,
thereby reducing the risk that an innocent person will be executed.
As I explained in Part II, Wiggins’ holding could be limited in at least three ways:
an attorney’s obligation to investigate for available mitigating evidence could be defined
so as to include only the obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence which can be
obtained without placing a strain on existing resources; an attorney’s obligation to
investigate for mitigating evidence could be limited to situations in which the attorney
does not receive contrary instructions from the defendant; and an attorney could be
afforded the right to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence on the basis of a
strategic decision when she perceives that the evidence likely to be revealed will be
double-edged in the sense that it is likely to conflict with her claim that the defendant was
innocent of the capital offense.
If Wiggins is to be interpreted in a way that will significantly diminish the risk of
sentencing innocent capital defendants to death, none of these limitations should apply.
As to the attorney’s duty to investigate for mitigating evidence, the ABA Standards
recognized by Wiggins as articulating professional norms for capital defense attorneys,
are clearly premised on the view a defense attorney must investigate for any reasonably
available mitigating evidence in every capital case. Even if she knows that the court will
limit the resources for defense investigation and believes that investigation relating to the

-94defense at the guilt trial is more important than investigation for mitigating evidence, the
attorney should file a motion with the court requesting the appointment of first, an
investigator who can trace the defendant’s background and social history; and, then,
whatever other investigators or experts appear necessary to seek and to render meaningful
the available mitigating evidence.277
Through filing this motion, the defense attorney will create a record establishing
the kind of resources the defense needed to investigate for “all reasonably available
mitigating evidence.” If the judge denies all or part of this motion, the reviewing courts
will then have to confront the questions of whether and to what extent the criminal justice
system is required to afford capital defense attorneys resources that will enable them to
conduct a full investigation for available mitigating evidence.
In accordance with the ABA Guidelines, a capital defendant’s attorney’s
obligation to investigate for all reasonably available mitigating evidence should also
apply regardless of the defendant’s contrary instructions. Interpreting the attorney’s
obligation in this way will ensure that a capital defendant will be able to make an
informed decision as to the sentencing strategy to be adopted at the penalty trial, if it
occurs. Protecting a capital defendant’s right to make an informed choice as to this
question is especially important, moreover, when the defendant has a strong claim of
innocence because, prior to the guilt trial at which he hopes to be acquitted, such a
defendant may be unable to focus on the consequences of adopting a particular
sentencing strategy at a penalty trial, which will only occur if his hopes for acquittal are
disappointed.
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In some cases, the motion would make it clear that the evidence found by the
first investigator will determine whether other experts need to be appointed.

-95And, finally, while Wiggins indicated that a capital defendant can make a
reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence, the Court
also appeared to recognize that the standard against which such strategic choices must be
measured should be one which reflects the practices of skilled and experienced capital
defense attorneys. Based on the practices of these attorneys, the following rule should be
adopted: an attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence
can never make a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating
evidence for the reason that she wants to emphasize the defendant’s innocence at the
penalty trial. Even if the potentially available mitigating evidence appears likely to be
double-edged, the attorney representing such a defendant should conduct a full
investigation and, barring very unusual circumstances, should introduce at least some of
the mitigating evidence at the penalty trial, if it occurs.
In Wiggins, the Court appeared to recognize that by 1989 the norms of practice
for capital defense attorneys had evolved to the point where the attorney ordinarily has
the obligation to investigate for “all reasonably available mitigating evidence.” Through
following the provisions of the ABA Guidelines relating to investigating for mitigating
evidence, capital defense attorneys can reduce the likelihood that innocent capital
defendants will be sentenced to death. And through applying Wiggins’ holding in ways
that reflect the underlying rationale of these Guidelines, courts can take at least a
meaningful step towards monitoring attorneys’ performance in a way that will reduce the
risk of an innocent defendant’s execution.

